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Unlike a number of the subject areas covered by this symposium,
Administrative Law in a Nova Scotia context has been much written
about in the last three years. There have been two conferences on
judicial review of administrative action sponsored by the Dalhousie
University Law School Public Services Committee. 2 Many of the
papers appearing in the proceedings of those conferences have a
distinctly Nova Scotian flavour.3 Indeed, the 1975 "University and
the Law" Conference sponsored by the same Committee also
featured a number of papers with a Nova Scotia Administrative
Law bent, 4 albeit of a much more specialized kind. Then in recent
months there have been two further Continuing Legal Education
conferences at Dalhousie on Regulation. 5 Hudson Janisch has made
*David J. Mullan, Associate Professor of Law, Dalhousie University
1. I acknowledge gratefully the comments and criticisms which I received when
writing this article from my colleagues Professors Donald H. Clark, Brian Hansen
and Hudson Janisch.
2. See H. N. Janisch, ed., Administrative Law Remedies (Halifax: Faculty of Law,
Dalhousie University, 1974) and H.N. Janisch, ed., Current Issues in
Administrative Law (Halifax: Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University, 1975). The
first of these Conferences was held on December 8, 1973 and the second on
December 7, 1974.
3. See, particularly, J. Kavanagh, "What is Meant by the Term "Judicial" for the
Purposes of the Prerogative Remedies?" at 9; G. McConnell, "Who Has Locus
Standi for a Remedy in Administrative Law?" at 36; D. Mullan, "What Use Can
and Should Be Made of a Declaratory Judgment in Modern Administrative Law?"
at 44; W. B. Gillis, "When is a Mandamus Available as an Administrative Law
Remedy?" at 57; Panel Discussion at 80 in Administrative Law Remedies and B.
Flemming, "Bias in a Modem Context" at 30; R. Murrant, "Certiorari in
Criminal Matters" at 50; I. Christie, "Metropolitan Life and Jurisdictional
Control" at 59; G. McConnell, "Regulations and the Ultra Vires Doctrine" at 76;
G. Cooper, "Mandamus and Building Permits" at 84 and Panel Discussion -
"Practice and Procedure of Administrative Boards" at 113 in Current Issues in
Administrative Law.
4. Held February 28-March 1, 1975. Seen H.N. Janisch, ed., The University and
the Law (Halifax: Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University, 1975).
5. (i) "Government Regulation and the Law" - held October 18, 1975 -
Proceedings, H.N. Janisch, ed. (Halifax: Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University,
1975).
(ii) "Telecommunications Regulation at the Crossroads" - held February 27-28,
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two contributions to Nova Scotia Law News on the subject of
Administrative Law, 6 while Tim McBride has written of Nova
Scotia's Ombudsman in the Dalhousie Law Journal. 7 Finally, I have
contributed a piece to an earlier issue of the Law Journal on the use
of the declaration as an Administrative Law remedy in this
province. 8
As a result of this hive of activity on the Administrative Law
front, I have decided in this survey to avoid repetition and, for the
most part, to confine myself to decisions that have not attracted any
written attention until now. However, I will be taking up a theme
discussed by Professor Innis Christie at December 1974's "Current
Issues in Administrative Law" Conference, 9 the theme of the Nova
Scotia courts' perception of the proper scope of judicial review of
administrative action.' 0 The first three cases dealt with will all be
discussed against this particular background. The rest of the article
will then be devoted to a survey of the Nova Scotia courts' handling
in recent months of issues concerned with the duty of decision-
makers to give a hearing to affected persons and the rules of natural
justice as they apply to particular hearings.
H. W. H. Schwartz & Sons Ltd.
Speaking at the 1974 "Current Issues in Administrative Law"
Conference," Professor Innis Christie, Chairman of the Nova
Scotia Labour Relations Board, 12 appeared to be quite optimistic
about the willingness of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court - Appeal
Division to allow administrative tribunals in this province to
interpret their empowering legislation unhindered by judicial
review. He remarked13:
1976 - Proceedings, H.N. Janisch, ed. (Halifax: Faculty of Law, Dalhousie
University, 1976).
6. H. N. Janisch, Administrative Law: Alive and Well and Living in Nova Scotia
(1974), 1 Nova Scotia Law News (No. 1) at 3 and H.N. Janisch, Regulations:
Publish or Perish (1974), 1 Nova Scotia Law News (No. 1) at 11.
7. T.J. McBride, The Nova Scotia Ombudsman (1975), 2 Dalhousie L.J. 182.
8. D. Mullan, The Declaratory Judgment: Its Place as an Administrative Law
Remedy in Nova Scotia (1975), 2 Dalhousie L.J. 9 1.
9. Supra, note 2.
10. 1. Christie, "Metropolitan Life and Jurisdictional Control", id. at 59.
11. Supra, note 2.
12. Supra, note 10.
13. Id. at 60-69.
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My point is simply that the courts should, and in Nova Scotia
probably will, be prepared to entertain arguments directed to the
function which the legislature obviously contemplated for the
inferior tribunal whose decision is under review. If the court can
be persuaded that in interpreting its own statute the tribunal is
performing a function which the legislature quite evidently
intended that it rather than the judges should perform, the court
will be loath to hold that the tribunal has "embark[ed] on an
inquiry or answer[ed] a question not remitted to it", to refer to
the language used by Mr. Justice Dickson in the Nipawin Nurses'
case. 14
In this respect, he referred 15 to the decision of the Nova Scotia
Supreme Court - Appeal Division in Re Nova Scotia Liquor
Commission16 in which the Court had refused to interfere with the
decision of the Labour Relations Board that the managers of Liquor
Stores were "employees" within the meaning of the Trade Union
Act. 17 At one point in his judgment, Coffin J.A. speaking for the
Court had in fact said
18
.. .if the inferior Court has jurisdiction to decide a matter and
enters upon the adjudication and does so decide, its conclusions
will not be reviewed.
Of course, in some situations, the courts have placed considerable
qualifications on the autonomy of tribunals deciding matters which
the legislature has entrusted to them. 19 However, the whole
14. Service Employees' International Union, Local No. 333 v. Nipawin District
Staff Nurses Association, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 382 at 389; 41 D.L.R. (3d) 6 at 12.
15. Supra, note 10 at 68.
16. (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 248; 47 D.L.R. (3d) 99 (sub nom. Re Nova Scotia
Office and Clerical Workers' Union, Local 1670 C.L.C. and Nova Scotia Liquor
Commission) (S.C., A.D.).
17. S.N.S. 1972, c. 19.
18. (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 248 at 260-261; 47 D.L.R. (3d) 99 at 108.
19. Probably the most commonly-cited Canadian examples are the two labour
cases: Jarvis v. Associated Medical Services Inc., [1964] S.C.R. 497; 44 D.L.R.
(2d) 407 and Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. International Union of Operating
Engineers, Local 796, [1970] S.C.R. 425; 11 D.L.R. (3d) 336. In this latter case,
the Supreme Court seemingly opened the door to the wholesale review of tribunal
decisions despite strongly-worded privative clauses by its adoption of a very broad
test for jurisdictional error from the House of Lords' decision in Anisminic Ltd. v.
Foreign Compensation Commission, [1969] 2 A.C. 147; [1969] 1 All E.R. 208
(See the judgment of Cartwright C.J.C. at 435; 11 D.L.R. (3d) at 344). However,
the judgment in Nipawin indicates that Metropolitan Life may not be as wide as was
thought originally. For the pertinent literature see, in addition to Professor Christie's
paper: P. Weiler, In the Last Resort (Toronto: Carswell Methuen, 1975) at 120-154
and The 'Slippery Slope' of Judicial Intervention (1971), 9 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1; P.
Hogg, The Supreme Court of Canada and Administrative Law, 1949-71 (1973), 11
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philosophy of Coffin J.A.'s judgment in the Liquor Commission
case suggested significant judicial restraint at least in relation to the
functioning of the Labour Relations Board.
Nevertheless, at least one subsequent decision does not seem to
have borne out Professor Christie's assessment and arguably makes
any prediction of when the courts will find reviewable error just as
uncertain as ever. In W. H. Schwartz & Sons Ltd. v. Bread, Cake,
Biscuit, Crackers, Candy, Confectionery & Miscellaneous Workers
Union, Local 446 and Labour Relations Board,20 the Appeal
Division was confronted by a decision of the Nova Scotia Labour
Relations Board to certify a union as a bargaining agent for a unit of
employees without first holding a vote of the employees. The
applicant company was seeking an order in the nature of certiorari
to quash the certification and an order in the nature of mandamus to
compel the Board to hold a vote of the employees of the proposed
unit. These remedies had been refused by Hart J. at first instance
21
and an appeal was taken to the Appeal Division.
The statutory background is crucial to the decision. Under s.
24(2) (b) of the Trade Union Act a vote must be held where the
Board is satisfied that between forty and sixty per cent of the unit
are members in good standing of the union applying for
certification. However, s. 24(2) (c) then goes on to provide a
dispensation from the mandatory provisions of subs. (b)
(c) notwithstanding clause (b) hereof, if the Board is satisfied that
the applicant trade union has as members in good standing more
than fifty per cent of the employees in the appropriate unit and the
Board is satisfied that no useful purpose will be served by
conducting a vote among the employees in the unit, it may certify
the trade union as the bargaining agent of the employees in the
unit.
There is no indication in the Act as to the principles upon which the
Board is to exercise its discretion not to order a vote. However, in
December 1973, the Governor in Council made a regulation
22
which bears upon the discretion. The relevant parts of this
regulation were as follows:
Osgoode Hall L. 187 and Judicial Review: How Much Do We Need? (1974), 20
McGill L.J. 157; J.N. Lyon, Comment (1971), 49 Can. B. Rev. 365. Note also of
course, that where there is no privative clause the courts possess the ability to
review tribunal decisions for all errors of law appearing on the face of the record.
20. (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 606 (S.C., A.D.).
21. Unreported judgment.
22. Strictly speaking, the Governor in Council repealed a regulation made on June
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2(1) In considering whether any useful purpose will be served by
conducting a vote among the employees under Section 24 of the
Act the Board shall have regard only to evidence as to the true
wishes of the employees, expressed by petition filed not later
than the terminal date fixed in accordance with subsection (2).
(3) For purposes of this Section, a petition is any evidence in
writing of any honest and voluntary statement by an employee or
employees either that they wish to be represented by the applicant
trade union or that they no longer wish to be represented by the
applicant trade union provided the Board is satisfied that it has
been:-
(a) signed by each employee so signifying and
(b) supported by oral testimony in the personal knowledge
and observation of the witness as to the origination of the
petition and the manner in which each signature was
obtained.
In Schwartz, an application has been made for certification of a
unit consisting of forty-nine employees. It was conceded that the
unit was an appropriate one for collective bargaining as required by
s. 24(1) and also that members of the Union in good standing
numbered between fifty and sixty per cent. Whether a vote was to
be held therefore came within the Board's discretionary powers
under s. 24(2) (c). As a result of advertisement of the certification
application in the employer's premises and a letter to the employees
from the employer's solicitor advising them of their rights and
containing forms which could be returned to the Board expressing
their wishes, nineteen employees wrote to the Board saying they
were not members of the Union and did not wish to be represented
by it. Another six stated that they had joined the Union but no
longer wished to be represented by the Union. At a hearing the
Board took evidence from eight of these "petitioners" and then
resolved not to order a vote before deciding on certification.
The Board's order dealt briefly with the question of a vote. 23
In the opinion of the Board the distribution by the employer to
14, 1972 and substituted a new regulation (R.N.S. 1973 at 161). The Governor in
Council is given power to make regulations under s. 9 of the Trade Union Act.
Note, also, s. 17(a) and (b) which gives the Board itself power to make regulations
(under (b), with the approval of the Governor in Council). For the legislative
history of the regulations, see I. Christie, Trade Union Certification: New
Regulations (1974), 1 Nova Scotia Law News (No. 1) 1.
23. Set out in the judgment of MacKeigan C.J.N.S.: (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 606 at
610.
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each employee of the Solicitor's letter and forms constitutes
interference with the expression of true wishes by the employees
such that no useful purpose would be served by conducting a
vote.
It was on this sentence that the applicant company in essence
founded its challenge to the Board's decision. It was argued that the
Board had thereby laid itself open to review by asking itself the
wrong question or by taking into account an irrelevant factor. By
asking whether the distribution of the letter constituted interference
with the true wishes of the employees, it was argued that the Board
had trespassed outside the narrow compass laid down for it in Reg.
2, a compass which confined the Board seemingly to a
consideration of the petitions presented by employees.
This argument was accepted by the Court. MacKeigan C.J. N.S.
delivering the judgment of himself, Coffin and Macdonald JJ.A.
stated:-
2 4
In the present case I must conclude that the Board made no
attempt to apply the test which the Nova Scotia Act and
Regulations prescribe and rather introduced a legally irrelevant
issue and applied an erroneous test. It thus erred in law on the
face of the record and exceeded its jurisdiction in wrongly
deciding the preliminary question upon which its jurisdiction to
certify without a vote was dependent. Applying in this case the
words of Lord Pearce in Anisminic Ltd. v. The Foreign
Compensation Commission et al., [1969] 1 All E.R. 208 (H.L.)
at pp. 213-4, we can say that the Board:
. . .misconstrued the provisions giving it power to act so
that it failed to deal with a question remitted to it and
decided some question which was not remitted to it.
There is nothing controversial about the language in which the
Court expressed its conclusion. Indeed, given that the determination
of whether there should be a vote was probably not protected by a
privative clause, 25 the Court really did not have to speak in terms of
24. Id. at 615-16.
25. Section 18(1) of the Trade Union Act contains a standard privative clause.
However, the issues of whether a vote should be ordered or whether petitions are
free and voluntary are not protected expressly by that section. Among the list of
protected decisions the only possibilities are (g) ("a group of employees is a unit
appropriate for collective bargaining") and (i) ("a person is a member in good
standing of a trade union"). However, looking at the structure of s. 24 of the Act,
these matters would seem to be prior and separate issues. Indeed, MacKeigan
C.J.N.S. may be taken to have recognized this in that in the extract cited he also
speaks of error of law on the face of the record as well as jurisdictional error (id.).
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jurisdictional error. Rather, the case could have been decided on the
basis that there was a non-jurisdictional error of law on the face of
the record. 26 However, the real question is whether a court with
greater sympathy to legislative purpose and the role of the Board
could have found a satisfactory way of refusing to review.
There were, it seems, three possible ways that the Court could
have upheld the Board's decision. The first and probably strongest
argument is that advanced to the Court by Mr. Pink appearing for
the respondent Union. This argument is to the effect that while the
Board may be able to consider petitions and petitions only in
deciding whether to hold a vote, Reg. 2 (3) defines petitions as
"evidence in writing of an honest and voluntary statement". From
this, it could perhaps be inferred that the Board's finding that there
was employer interference was in reality a finding in terms of the
legislation that the petitions were not in fact "honest and
voluntary". 27
The Court did not accept the invitation to give the Board the
benefit of the doubt on this point. 28
I. cannot find a word in the Board's decision which suggests
to me that it directed its attention to whether the petitions were in
fact voluntary or the effect of the petitions.
Admittedly, the Board's decision was cryptic and went no way
towards linking explicitly the reasons for its decision to the
language of the legislation. Indeed, in my opinion, it is most
unfortunate that the Labour Relations Board does not submit to the
discipline of giving full reasons for its decisions. 29 Nevertheless,
sufficient judicial respect for the role and expertise of the Board
could quite easily have persuaded a sympathetic court to fill in the
gaps in the reasoning process and to infer that the Board had acted in
accord with the Regulation.
26. See the extract from MacKeigan C.J.N.S.'s judgment just referred to. Of
course, a court wishing to justify a comprehensive examination of whether the
petitions were free and voluntary could have described this issue as one of
jurisdictional fact, thereby allowing itself to substitute its opinion for that of the
Board not only on questions of law but also of fact. Nevertheless, despite the use of
the word "preliminary" by MacKeigan C.J.N.S., it is difficult to classify this
question as a preliminary and collateral one of jurisdictional fact. It would seem to
be too far into the heart of the Board's jurisdiction to allow such a classification to
be made.
27. Id. at 612.
28. Id. at 613.
29. Discussed infra, in relation to Canada Automatic Sprinkler Association v.
Labour Relations Board (1974), 14 N.S.R. (2d) 36 (S.C., T.D.).
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However, not only was the Court not prepared to go that far but it
also indicated that, even if the decision had been related to the
language of the statute, the application would still have been
granted. According to the Court, there was simply no evidence that
the petitions were involuntary and dishonest; thus, this lack of
evidence also constituted reviewable error.
30
The ability of a court to review the decision of an administrative
tribunal on the ground of a lack of evidence has always been
controversial, principally because of the extreme flexibility of a rule
that a decision made on the basis of no evidence involves a
reviewable error of law. 31 What does "no evidence" mean?
Absolutely no evidence? No evidence of probative value? No
legally admissible evidence? No reasonable evidence? Given this
range of possibilities within the "no evidence" test, there is a
danger that the courts will use this as a basis for a review of the
merits of a particular decision. Indeed, this is demonstrated amply
by the following extract from MacKeigan C.J.N.S.'s judgment.
32
If the Board's decision can be construed, which I very much
doubt, as a finding that mere distribution of the solicitor's letter
and forms was per se an act which made involuntary any petitions
using such forms, such a conclusion would in my opinion be
clearly illogical and wrong. The mere fact that an employee uses
a form supplied by the employer does not prove that the
employee, in using that form letter, was necessarily not
expressing honestly and voluntarily his true wishes. Suspicion
may well arise in an employer-employee relationship that an
employee may, out of fear or out of desire to curry favour, do
what he thinks his employer may want him to do, even though
contrary to his true desire. Suspicion, however, is far short of
proof.
In essence, what the "no evidence" test seems to have become here
is a standard whereby the Board will be reviewed unless the court is
satisfied that it has been proved that the petitions are not free and
voluntary. To go this far is, of course, to take over completely the
task assigned by the legislation to the Board. However, it may be
that all the statement involves is an assertion that forms sent out by
the employer have no evidential value on their own on the question
30. (1975), 12N.S.R. (2d) 606 at 613.
31. For a comprehensive discussion of this issue as it pertains to Administrative
Law see D.W. Elliott, ''No Evidence": A Ground of Judicial Review in Canadian
Administrative Law (1972), 37 Sask. L. Rev. 48.
32. (1975), 12N.S.R. (2d) 606 at 613.
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of honesty and voluntariness. But, even this can be seen as an
instance of the reviewing court second-guessing the expert tribunal
on the probative value of evidence.
Moreover, later on in the course of the judgment, MacKeigan
C.J.N.S. gives a further indication of his willingness to become
involved in the essence of a determination which has been left by
the legislature to the expert Board.
33
And, if a majority of employees in the bargaining unit, including,
of course, some who had previously signed up as union
members, presented petitions claiming that they did not want the
union to represent them, the Board would, I suggest, have no
option but to order a vote despite suspicion or even strong
evidence of employer influence (provided such evidence fell
short of proving the petitions to be non-voluntary).
It is hard to interpret this statement as anything but a direction from
the Court to the Board as to how the Board is to exercise its
discretion in particular cases. Indeed, the Chief Justice, while
talking in the hypothetical, presumably had this very case in mind.
On the petitions twenty-five out of forty-nine had indicated an
unwillingness to be represented by the Union. Having found that
there was "no evidence" of involuntariness, the Chief Justice must
be saying that the Board had no choice in this particular instance.
This also constitutes a significant trespass into the heart of the
Board's jurisdiction. Perhaps the only justification for such a
statement is if it is seen as an attempt by the Court to draw the
Board's attention to the extreme situation in which it would be
prepared to review a Board decision for abuse of discretion on the
basis that no reasonable tribunal in the circumstances could ever
have failed to order a vote. 
34
The argument put forward by Mr. Pink required the Court to read
the Board's reasons sympathetically and infer from those reasons
that the Board had in mind its statutory mandate. Not only was such
33. Id. at 615.
34. See the judgment of Coffin J.A. (discussed infra) in N.S. Forest Industries v.
N.S. Pulpwood Marketing Board (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 91 at 115-17; 61 D.L.R.
(3d) 97 at 125-27 (sub nom. Re Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags Aktiebolag and Nova
Scotia Woodlot Owners' Association) (S.C., A.D.) for an example of this ground
of review. Interestingly enough, a later case, in which Schwartz was followed,
would almost seem to amount to another example of review on this basis. In the as
yet unreported decision of Dominion Stores Ltd. v. Labour Relations Board (Nova
Scotia) (S.H. 07063, judgment delivered:- October 21, 1975), Cowan C.J.T.D.
ostensibly ruled in favour of review on the basis that
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a reading not forthcoming but the Court indicated its preparedness
to review the decision even if that argument was accepted and, in
the course of discussing the "no evidence" test, hinted at a
significant willingness to second-guess the Board in the exercise of
its discretionary power. Such an approach scarcely bears out the
optimistic tone of Professor Christie's address.
A second possible argument that might have been made was that,
even if the Board was justified in considering the petitions and only
the petitions in deciding whether to order a vote, it could still look at
the circumstances under which the petitions originated. In other
words, when Reg. 2(1) speaks of having regard only to petitions, it
is not to be read as restricting the Board to the contents of the
petitions but rather, to borrow a term from the law of Evidence,
allows the Board to look at the res gestae. Once again, this is a
way that a sympathetic court could have approached the problem
and inferred from the Board's reasons that the petitions were being
discounted because of the interference by the employers which gave
rise to the making of those petitions. The weakness of this argument
is that it addresses itself to the freeness and voluntariness of the
petitions, a matter already covered specifically under Reg. 2(3).
The argument is in fact foreshadowed by the first argument based on
subs. 3 and made by Mr. Pink.
The final possible argument is quite fascinating. If one studies the
legislative history of Reg. 2,35 it appears that the purpose of the
Regulation was not in fact to compel the Board to look only at
petitions but rather to require the Board in looking at petitions to pay
attention to only those petitions which are honest and voluntary.
Indeed, it is hard to think of reasons why the Governor in Council
...it is quite clear from the transcript that the Board did not direct itself to the
question as to whether the petitions, or any of them, were "honest and
voluntary statements". (Reasons for Judgment at 27).
Yet, in this case, there was nothing in the reasons of the Board to suggest that the
correct question had not been asked and those extracts from the transcript cited by
Cowan C.J.T.D. would seem to indicate that the Board was indeed concerned with
whether the petitions were honest and voluntary. If that is accurate, then the Board
was reviewed because the judge disagreed with the Board on this point. A further
factor in this case may of course have been the fact that the Board decided this
matter before the Appeal Division decision in Schwartz had been delivered, this
perhaps leading the Chief Justice to assume that the Board must have gone about its
task in the wrong manner.
35. See I. Christie's comment, supra, note 22. Also discussed by Brian Hansen,
John MacPherson and Larry Steinberg, Recent Developments in Labour Law in
Nova Scotia (1976), 2 Dalhousie L.J. 791 at 806-808.
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would want to make a regulation preventing the Board from looking
at anything beside petitions in deciding whether to order a vote.
36
The real interests of the Board are in having as much flexibility as
possible in the factors it can take into account in deciding whether or
not to order a vote. On the other hand to avoid the possibility of
inappropriate judicial review, the Governor in Council may
understandably have wanted to provide that the Board could
discount or disregard petitions considered to be either dishonest or
involuntary.
37
Given that this was the "legislative" purpose in making the
regulation could the Court have taken it into account in this
particular instance? Looking once again at the provisions of Reg.
2(1) which state that "the Board shall have regard only to evidence
as to the true wishes of the employees, expressed by petition...", it
would in fact seem structurally impossible to interpret those words
as requiring the Board to look at only certain of the petitions but
leaving it free to look at other material as well as petitions. The
separation of subsections (1) and (3) does not help. Moreover,
whether "only" is regarded as referring to "evidence" or "true
wishes", there would seem to be no grammatically feasible way of
avoiding the interpretation that petitions and petitions alone were to
be taken into account.
The question then becomes whether the reviewing court could
have simply ignored the rules of grammar, excused the sloppiness
of the drafting and allowed the legislative purpose to be achieved.
After all, it might be argued that the Board had a role in the making
of the Regulation; it knew what the Regulation was intended to
36. This argument would, of course, assume more force if the Board itself had
made the regulation under s. 17 of the Trade Union Act.
37. It is, however, difficult to think of a court reviewing a decision for failure to
take account of relevant factors simply because the Board discounted or
disregarded petitions after having considered them. Nevertheless, the Board may
have been jumpy after having been reviewed in Sobeys Stores Ltd. v. Nova Scotia
Labour Relations Board (1973), 13 N.S.R. (2d) 231; 41 D.L.R. (3d) 641 (sub
nom. Re Sobeys Stores Ltd. and Canadian Food and Allied Workers' Union, Local
P-1157) (S.C., T.D.) for deciding the issue of the percentage of those in the
proposed unit who were members in good standing of the Union as at the date of the
application, as opposed to the date of the hearing of the application. This was
followed in Gulf Oil Canada Ltd. v. N.S. Labour Relations Board, judgment of
Jones J., as yet unreported, judgment delivered: 1973, and in Theriault & Son Ltd.
v. Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers of Canada, Local 27,
judgment of Jones J., as yet unreported. Indeed, this rationale is implicit in
Professor Christie's comment, supra, note 22.
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achieve and everyone in the labour relations community knew what
the Regulation was really getting at so no harm was done by
twisting the words a little. However, to do that would be to ignore
virtually the words altogether and even under the most extreme
purposive view of statutory interpretation the words used are not
completely irrelevant.3 8 Perhaps the Board in its non-legislative
functions can use words in a unique sense and say things which do
not have the meaning that would normally be associated with them.
However, it is somewhat different when the Governor in Council or
the Board is making publicly promulgated regulations. In that
context, the courts cannot be expected to abandon all attention to the
words used and give effect to the legislative purpose, even if to do
that would be to promote the shared expectations of most groups
involved in the collective bargaining process. 39 "Alice in
Wonderland" logic has no place in the interpretation of public
enactments of a legislative body.
Of course, one response to this is that the courts should be able to
break through the normal use of language when not to do so would
produce an absurdity. 40 That a failure to do this produces an
absurdity here is to some extent illustrated by the earlier Appeal
Division decision of Aerovox Canada Ltd. v. International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 625 and Nova Scotia
Labour Relations Board.41 This raised the issue of the role of the
Board if there are no petitions filed. If the Board can take into
account petitions and petitions alone, does that mean that the Board
can take no decision if there are no petitions or, more accurately,
that the Board cannot exercise its discretion not to order a vote if
there are no petitions because there is no evidential basis for the
exercise of that discretion? Not so, said the Appeal Division!
4 2
38. Felix Frankfurter has probably captured the sense of the judge's task in
interpreting statutes as well as anybody. He speaks of interpretation as not being
".. an opportunity for a judge to use words as 'empty vessels into which he can
pour anything he will' - his caprices, fixed notions, even statesmenlike beliefs in
a particular policy". Rather the task is to find "[wihat is below the surface of the
words and yet fairly a part of them". See Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes (1947), 47 Col. L. Rev. 527 at 529 and 533.
39. This statement reflects a belief on my part that the opportunity for the
'twisting' of words may be greater when one is concerned, for instance, with a
bilateral contractual document then with a public enactment relied on generally.
40. The so-called "Golden Rule" of statutory construction. Discussed in Craies
on Statute Law, ed. S.G.G. Edgar (7th ed. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1971) at
84-86.
41. (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d)55 (S.C., A.D.).
42. Id. at 58.
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• . . In this case, there were no such petitions before the Board
and therefore no basis for it to consider whether a vote should be
held.
The Board's decision [not to order a vote] is clearly one which
it had the sole discretion to make and which was fully within its
discretion.
Yet to do this would seem to contradict the philosophy of s. 24 -
there should be a vote if there is between fifty and sixty per cent
union membership unless there are grounds for the Board
dispensing with that requirement.
What the Court's decision in the Aerovox case seems to amount to
is that the Board has a completely unfettered discretion if there are
no petitions but that the moment the Board in the exercise of this
discretion looks at evidence other than petitions it is committing a
reviewable error. In so far as this amounts to a prohibition on
sensible inquiry it is an absurd result. Almost as absurd, however,
would be a result in which the Court had held that the Board had to
order a vote if there were no petitions. That also defeats sensible
inquiry.
In the end it seems that all the Board can do if there are no
petitions is to play around with numbers. E.g., If there is only
fifty-three per cent membership a vote will be ordered but if there is
fifty-nine per cent membership there is no need for a vote. Such
rules of thumb are of course not completely illogical. However,
even this limited form of inquiry is thrown into jeopardy by the
following statement of MacKeigan C. J.N. S. in Schwartz:
In the Aerovox case . . . . there were no petitions and thus no
evidence upon which a decision to hold a vote could be based.
This suggests that even playing with numbers is out and that the
Board cannot order a vote unless there are some free and voluntary
petitions. In so far as this goes back on the statement in Aerovox
itself that the Board has an unfettered discretion if there are no
petitions, it amounts to an even greater contradiction of the
philosophy of s. 24.
Essentially, the result of all this is a Regulation drafted in a
manner so confusing as to place the courts in an impossible
dilemma. The Act suggests that, if there is between fifty and sixty
per cent membership, there should be a vote unless there is evidence
to the contrary. Yet, under the Regulation, as interpreted in
43. (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 606 at 615.
Recent Developments in Nova Scotian Administrative Law 883
Schwartz, the only admissible evidence is evidence which tends to
show that there should not be a vote. Only by rewriting the
Regulation could the courts reach a result that would promote
effectively the desired policy. However, to do this would be to go
beyond the judicial mandate. In Schwartz, a satisfactory result could
have been reached by accepting Mr. Pink's argument, but even that
argument does not solve the "Catch 22" dilemma of Aerovox and
the situation where no petitions are filed. Redrafting of the
Regulation is the only statisfactory solution.
In summary, the Court in Schwartz was not as attuned as it might
have been to the function of the Board. However, the Board may be
viewed as having contributed to a large extent to its own
misfortunes in this case; first, by a badly-drafted regulation and,
secondly, by a failure to articulate clearly in its decision the
reasoning process which led to the decision not to order a vote.
Perhaps in the end, Schwartz tells little about the Court's philosophy
on the role of tribunals, though it must be admitted that some of the
dicta in the case hint at a greater willingness to interfere than was
suggested by Professor Christie in his lecture.
III. Nova Scotia Forest Industries
Schwartz was not the only case in the period under survey where the
Appeal Division reviewed for jurisdictional error. In N.S. Forest
Industries v. N.S. Pulpwood Marketing Board,44 jurisdictional
error was again the ground for the Court's award of relief in the
nature of certiorari, an award which as in Schwartz was a reversal
of the trial judge's decision. 45
Against a background of growing discontent on the part of
woodlot owners at the price they were receiving for pulpwood from
the large sawmills, the Nova Scotia legislature in 1972 enacted the
Pulpwood Marketing Act.4 6 This legislation, unlike other provincial
marketing schemes, provided for a form of collective bargaining.
Under the Act, the Pulpwood Marketing Board was made
responsible for the certification of groups to engage in collective
44. (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 91; 61 D.L.R. (3d) 97 (sub nom. Re Stora
Kopparbergs Bergslags Aktiebolag and Nova Scotia Woodlot Owners' Association)
(S.C., A.D.).
45. (1974), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 131; 54 D.L.R. (3d) 740 (sub nom. Re Stora
Kopparbergs Bergslags Aktiebolag and Nova Scotia Woodlot Owners' Association)
(N.S.S.C., T.D.).
46. S.N.S. 1972, c. 15.
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bargaining with the mills over the price of pulpwood. This role was
quite different from the normal role of a provincial marketing board.
Such bodies usually are the licensors and price-setters and
frequently the agency through which a particular commodity is
exclusively sold. The introduction of such a marketing plan for the
sale of pulpwood under the Natural Products Marketing Act47 had
not proved feasible and the Pulpwood Marketing Act of 1972
represented a compromise response.
Under s. 4(1) of the Act, the Board was given power to register
any association as bargaining agent "for all or any group or groups
of producers or buyers of pulpwood". This was expanded upon by
s. 8(1):
An association may make application to the Board to be
registered as the bargaining agent for all or any group or groups
of producers or buyers of pulpwood and upon registration by the
Board shall be the sole bargaining agent for the producers or
buyers for which it is registered as bargaining agent, and before
registering any such association as a bargaining agent the Board
shall hold a public hearing.
However, compared with the Trade Union Act, the provisions of the
legislation are for the most part "very general in form and, indeed,
sketchy". 48For example, and of particular relevance in the decision
of the Appeal Division,
49
[t]he Act pointedly refrains from requiring, as the Trade Union
Act does, various percentages of membership in the union or
association. The Board merely has to ascertain the support or
desires of the sellers in a general way.
This in fact had been adverted to by the then Minister of Lands and
Forests 50 in leading off the Second Reading Debate of the Act in the
House of Assembly. 51
If the bill seems to avoid details and to establish powers that are
permissive rather then mandatory, this is by design. I believe, Mr.
Speaker, that a carefully selected board working closely with all
sections of the forest industry, will be able to develop an effective
marketing plan.
47. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 206as am. S.N.S. 1970-71, c. 54.
48. (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 91 at 126; 61 D.L.R. (3d) 97 at 104 (per MacKeigan
C.J.N.S.).
49. Id. at 129; 61 D.L.R. (3d) at 107.
50. The Honourable B. Comeau.
51. N.S. H. ofA. Debates (May 4, 1972) at 2331 (Volume 3, 1972).
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The Nova Scotia Woodlot Owners' Association represented most of
the small woodlot owners in the province and it was largely for their
benefit that the legislation was passed. Nevertheless, the small
woodlot owner was not the only person potentially covered by the
legislation in that the term "producer" was defined in the Act to
include anyone who sold pulpwood in the province. 52 Such a wide
definition caught not only the small woodlot owners but also the
larger commercial producers of pulpwood as well as the five large
mills in the province which as part of their business sold pulpwood
at times.
In 1974, the Woodlot Owners' Association applied to the Board
under s. 8(1) for registration as bargaining agent for all "primary
producers". 53 A little later an application was received from the
Nova Scotia Forest Products Association, essentially the association
of the larger commercial producers, for registration as the
bargaining agent for all producers throughout the province
excluding the five large mills. The ultimate result of these
somewhat opposing applications was that the Board certified the
Nova Scotia Woodlot Owners' Association as the bargaining agent
for all producers of pulpwood in the province and then declared that
a bargaining situation existed between the Woodlot Owners
Association and the five large mills in the province, including the
appellant.
The appellant sought an order in the nature of certiorari from
Jones J. to quash both these decisions of the Board but was
successful only with respect to the latter.5 As a result an appeal and
cross-appeal were launched. One of the issues raised was the failure
of the Board to observe the rules of natural justice and this is one of
the bases on which Coffin J.A. was prepared to quash the
52. Sees. I(i):
.producer" is a person who sells pulpwood and "production" includes the
selling of pulpwood...
53. It was never clear what the term "primary producers" meant. However,
MacKeigan C.J.N.S. assumed all along that it was not intended as a simile for "all
producers" but rather connoted a lesser group. ((1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 91 at
128-29; 61 D.L.R. (3d) 97 at 106-07). However cf. the trial judgment of Jones J.
((1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 131 at 145-46; 54 D.L.R. (3d) 740 at 752):
I think it was clear to all concerned that the Woodlot Owners' Association was
asking to represent all producers in the Province.
54. Jones J. quashed the second decision because of a failure to observe the rules
of natural justice. Id. at 147-48; 54 D.L.R. (3d) at 754-55.
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certification decision. 55 However, both Coffin J.A. and MacKeigan
C.J.N.S. were also of the opinion that there had been a
jurisdictional error and it is here that the case is of interest for
present purposes, particularly as the judges took superficially
divergent routes in reaching this conclusion. (Incidentally,
Macdonald J.A. concurred without reasons in both judgments. 56)
At a superficial level there are three things about the Board's
certification decision which are immediately striking. First, the
Woodlot Owners only asked to be certified as agent for primary
producers and the Board in fact certified them to represent all
producers of pulpwood in the province. 57 Secondly, members of the
Woodlot Owners' Association only accounted for approximately
seven per cent of the pulpwood supplied to the province's five
largest mills. Thirdly, the members of the Forest Products
Association which supplied the bulk of that wood were quite
opposed to being represented by the Woodlot Owners' Association.
In the course of his judgment MacKeigan C.J.N.S. discussed
quite extensively the logistics of the pulpwood industry in Nova
Scotia and the background to the legislation including his own
involvement as a government-appointed conciliator attempting 58
. . . to reconcile the Woodlot Owners and the Forest Products
Association as to a form of marketing plan.
Indeed, it is quite significant that although conciliation proved
impossible the Chief Justice had recommended that the
government introduce collective bargaining as an attempt to resolve
the problem.
The Chief Justice then went on to distill what he saw as the
essence of a collective bargaining system. There 59
. . . are two essential principles which must be observed if any
collective bargaining is to be just and effective, or even possible.
The first is that the group or groups for whom the agent is to be
permitted to bargain should be, to use labour law terms,
"appropriate for collective bargaining". The second, a corollary
of the first, is that the bargaining agent must be shown to have the
support of the sellers of the group ...
A group of sellers to be appropriate for collective bargaining
and one for which the agent "can bargain best" . . . must be
55. Discussed infra.
56. (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 91 at 94; 61 D.L.R. (3d) 97 at 130.
57. See, however, supra, note 53.
58. (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 91 at 126; 61 D.L.R. (3d) 97 at 104.
59. Id. at 127-28; 61 D.L.R. (3d) at 105-06.
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reasonably homogeneous with a real community of interest in
that they grow, cut, and sell pulpwood in much the same way and
are subject to the same economic forces and incentives. The
sellers in the group must be more or less equally affected by the
terms of the prospective agreement to be made for them all.
Having identified the philosophy which he saw behind the scheme
created by the legislation, the Chief Justice analyzed in Anisminic
terms 60 how the Board had committed reviewable error by asking
itself the wrong question. It failed to deal with the appropriateness
of the group which the Woodlot Owners wished to represent.
61
Indeed it certified the Woodlot Owners as bargaining agent for a
wider group than the association had asked to represent. 62 It failed
to have regard to the fact that a significant number of "producers"
clearly did not want the Woodlot Owners to represent them. 63 In
summary it disregarded what MacKeigan C.J.N.S. regarded as 64
. . . the basic principles of collective bargaining . . . [which] go
to the very heart of the task the Board was to perform.
At one level it is possible to see the judgment of the Chief Justice
as another example of a court interfering too readily with the
decision of an expert board. When the Chief Justice describes the
decision of the Board as involving "grievous error" it sounds much
more like the language of appeal than of review. 65 However, in this
instance there is much more to the decision than just that. First, the
Court was here confronted by a new agency dealing with a new
statute containing no privative clause. In such a context, the
arguments of tribunal expertise and legislative signposting of
judicial restraint are not quite so strong as for example when a court
is confronted by a decision of the long-established Labour Relations
Board many of whose determinations are protected by a privative
clause. Secondly, we have the Court dealing with a concept with
which it was familiar as a result of many encounters with the Nova
60. As in Schwartz (supra, note 24), MacKeigan C.J.N.S. purported to cite from
the judgment of Lord Pearce in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation
Commission, [1969] 2 A.C. 147 at 171; (1969) 1 All E.R. 208 at 213-14 (id. at
130: 61 D.L.R. (3d) at 108). He was in fact quoting Lord Reid. Note also that as in
Schwartz, there being no privative clause, it did not matter to MacKeigan C.J.N.S.
whether the error was described as jurisdictional or as one appearing on the face of
the record (at 130:61 D.L.R. (3d) at 108).
61. Id. at 128-29: 61 D.L.R. (3d) at 108.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 129:61 D.L.R. (3d) at 107.
64. Id. at 130:61 D.L.R. (3d) at 108.
65. Id. at 129: 61 D.L.R. (3d) at 107.
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Scotia Labour Relations Board. With respect to the general
parameters of that concept the Court because of its experience was
almost certainly in a better position than the marketing board.
Thirdly, the judgment of MacKeigan C.J.N.S. identifies that this
was not a case in which the expert board had after careful
consideration reached a decision which would normally be entitled
to judicial deference. Rather the Board's approach or perhaps lack
of approach indicated a total disregard, even failure to consider the
legislative scheme within which it was operating. Of course it could
be argued that the legislation was left deliberately sketchy to enable
the Board to develop its own peculiar form of collective bargaining.
However, even this does not excuse such disregard of what
MacKeigan C.J.N.S. describes uncontroversially as the bedrock
principles of any scheme of collective bargaining. What seems to
have happened here is that the Board has lost sight of the scheme of
the legislation and the position of other parties and accorded too
great a consideration to the fact that the legislation was intended
primarily for the benefit of members of the Woodlot Owners'
Association.
In summary, what we have in this instance is an example of a
judge doing what judges do best in judicial review proceedings. To
use the terminology of an advocate of very limited judicial review,
Peter W. Hogg, the Court is acting here to perserve "general
values". 6 6 It is not becoming involved in the minutiae of a
complex, specialized statutory scheme. Rather, the judgment of
MacKeigan C.J.N.S. measures the conduct of the Board against the
general philosophy of the Act and finds a clear case of aberration.
Though Coffin J.A. reaches the same conclusion, he does not
paint with the same broad brush as the Chief Justice. The legislative
history is scarcely considered with the result that the judgment is not
predicated explicitly on what the judge regards as the fundamental
scheme of the Act. Rather, he asserts after the citation of much
authority that the Board has committed jurisdictional error because
it has made a decision which is so unreasonable that no reasonable
tribunal would ever have made it. 6 7 First, he finds it unreasonable
66. See Judicial Review: How Much Do We Need?, supra, note 19 at 164-167. 1
should say, however, that the use of Professor Hogg's terminology here is perhaps
not a use with which he would agree. The "general values" that he refers to are
more the general shared values of our society rather than the general values that
might be seen as the background of a particular piece of legislation.
67. (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 91 at 117;61D.L.R. (3d) 97 at 127.
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"for 6.8% to represent 100% of the suppliers" 68 and, secondly, he
finds reviewable error in the Board's failure to consider the
constitutions of the various constitutent members of the Woodlot
Owners' Association, constitutions which in a number of instances
are highly restrictive of membership, meaning that many of those
producers certified to be represented by the Woodlot Owners'
Association could not be members of that Association. 69
It is perhaps pertinent to make a comment on each of these
findings. In contrast to Coffin J.A., MacKeigan C.J.N.S. was not
prepared to find anything necessarily unreasonable in 6.8%
representing 100% of producers. 70 Rather for the Chief Justice, the
principal concern was whether the Board had made any attempt to
consider the wishes of the other 93.2%. On the second point, it is
not a necessary incident of collective bargaining that all members of
the unit be eligible for membership of the representative body, 71
though of course the relevant constitution will be a significant
matter as far as any certifying board is concerned and failure to take
account of membership restrictions can perhaps justifiably be
regarded as giving rise to jurisdictional error. Nevertheless, to
review on this basis is to exhibit a somewhat narrower and less
generalist approach to the legislation than that of the judgment of
the Chief Justice.
From the point of view of the grounds of judicial review, Coffin
J.A.'s judgment is quite significant as one of the very few cases in
which a judge has been prepared to review an exercise of discretion
on the bases of reasonableness. 72 Nevertheless, even though
68. Id.
69. Id. at 121; 61 D.L.R. (3d) at 130.
70. Id. at 130; 61 D.L.R. (3d) at 107-08.
71. See e.g. s. 92(4) of the Ontario Labour Relations Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 232.
This subsection was a response to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. International Union of Operating Engineers,
Local 796, [1970] S.C.R. 425; 11 D.L.R. (3d) 336 and provides that ineligibility
for membership does not necessarily mean that someone cannot be a member of the
union for the purposes of the statute provided that the union has an established
practice of admitting such persons to membership despite the eligibility
requirements. This reflects the Ontario LRB practice before Metropolitan Life.
(See J. Sack and M. Levinson, Ontario Labour Relations Board Practice (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1973). Quaere, however whether Metropolitan Life might have been
applied in N.S. Forest Industries.
72. For two Canadian examples, see Re Pecseyne and Hamilton Police
Commissioners Board, [1973] 1 O.R. 142; 30 D.L.R. (3d)418 (D.C.) and Chaulk
v. Town of South River (1971), 2 N. & P.E.I.R. I (Nfld. S.C.). However, i.t is
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MacKeigan C.J.N.S. uses the rubric of the Board asking itself the
wrong question, it is relatively easy to see how he could also have
used the language of unreasonableness to justify his result. A
decision taken in face of basic principles of collective bargaining
just as well merits the description of manifest unreasonableness as it
does that of asking the wrong question.
At one time administrative lawyers used to think of abuse of
discretion and jurisdictional error as separate categories of judicial
review. Manifest unreasonableness, irrelevant factors, failure to
take account of relevant factors, acting under dictation tended to be
the language of abuse of discretion. Preliminary and collateral error
and asking the wrong question tended to be the language of
jurisdictional error. The myth of this separation was exploded
dramatically in Anisminic73 and, in cases such as the N.S. Forest
Industries decision, we see the aftermath of Anisminic in which one
judge uses the old language of abuse of discretion to justify review
while the other uses the language of jurisdictional error. Indeed,
Coffin J.A. speaks of unreasonableness and asking the wrong
question virtually as if they are the same thing.
7 a
Even less than Schwartz, N.S. Forest Industries is not a case
which tells us too much about the Appeal Division's willingness to
second-guess tribunals. This is mainly so because the Board's
decision showed a flagrant disregard of legislative purpose, a
disregard which was accentuated by Coffin J.A.'s additional finding
of breach of the rules of natural justice. Indeed, in contrast to the
rather cryptic judgment of Coffin J.A., the judgment of MacKeigan
C.J.N.S. in this case represents a sensitive and sensible approach
towards the scope of judicial review. It is a judgment characterized
by a well-tempered use of legislative history and a generalist
approach rather than one that descends into the heart of matters
confided in the Board.
worth noting that in Pecseyne the court really seemed to be talking about lack of
good faith more than the merits and Chaulk was a statutory appeal and not a judicial
review application.
73. Particularly in Lord Reid's much-quoted statement where he describes
reviewable error in very broad terms and mixes the language of review for
jurisdictional error and review for abuse of discretion: [1969] 2 A.C. 147 at 171;
[1969] 1 All E.R. 208 at 213-14. The statement was in fact cited in toto by Coffin
J.A. in the N.S. Forest Industries case ((1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 91 at 113-14; 61
D.L.R. (3d) 97 at 124).
74. Id. at 115-16:61 D.L.R. (3d) at 125-26.
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IV. Walker v. Keating
In Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission, 75 the House of
Lords defined jurisdictional error so widely that commentators
expressed the view that there would no longer be any need to
consider the availability of review for error of law on the face of the
record. 76 Jurisdictional error as defined in Anisminic seemed wide
enough to embrace any error of law that a tribunal might make in the
course of its decision-making process. With the approval of
Anisminic by the Supreme Court of Canada in Metropolitan Life, 77
the same seemed to be true in this country and, while there has been
some retreat from Anisminic and Metropolitan Life7 8 lately, the
judgment of MacKeigan C.J.N.S. in the N.S. Forest Industries
decision reflects the degree of overlap that there has come to be.
79
The Board's errors in disregarding the basic principles of
collective bargaining invalidate the registration order which must
accordingly be quashed. They go to the very heart of the task the
Board was to perform. It matters little whether they are labelled
excess of jurisdiction, errors of law on the face of the record or
failure to exercise jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, despite this assimilation, error of law on the
face of the record continues to have a significant existence in the
administrative law cases of this province. It is of course frequently
invoked in applications to quash arbitration awards. 80 Indeed, it has
always been the most common ground for setting aside such
awards. Also, error of law on the face of the record continues to be
pleaded in applications to review the decisions of statutory
tribunals. Habit probably explains a lot. However, simply to rely on
75. [1969] 2 A.C. 147;,[1969] 1 All E.R. 208.
76. See e.g. S. A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3d ed.
London: Stevens, 1973) at 357.
77. [1970] S.C.R. 425 at 435; 11 D.L.R. (3d) 336 at 344.
78. Discussed by Innis Christie in "Metropolitan Life and Jurisdictional Control",
supra, note 3 at 64-72. See the decisions referred to in those pages.
79. (1974), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 91 at 130; 61 D.L.R. (3d) 97 at 108.
80. See e.g. Otis Elevator Co. v. International Union of Elevator Constructors,
Local 125 (1973), 5 N.S.R. (2d) 437; 36 D.L.R. (3d) 402 (sub nom. Re Otis
Elevator Co. and International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local 125) (S.C.,
A.D.); Canadian General Electric Co. v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers
International Union, Local 9-832 (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 550; 56 D.L.R. (3d) 745
(sub nom. Re Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International Union, Local 9-832
and Canadian General Electric Co. Ltd.) (S.C., A.D.); Canadian Keyes Fibre Co.
v. United Paperworkers International Union, Local 574 (1974), 8 N.S.R. (2d) 81;
44 D.L.R. (3d) 305 (S.C., A.D.).
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jurisdictional error can still be dangerous and pleading error of law
on the face of the record in the alternative is a prudent safeguard
against a situation where the court finds error of law but does not
classify the error as jurisdictional. Indeed, in some instances,
despite Anisminic, it is much easier to think of the error of law that
is being alleged as one within jurisdiction rather than one going to
jurisdiction. One such recent case in Nova Scotia is the decision of
the Appeal Division in Walker v. Keating,81 a decision which not
only emphasizes the continued existence of review for error of law
on the face of the record but which also highlights the continued
lack of clarity in the law as to just what constitutes the record for
such purposes.
Walker was a teacher employed by the West Hants Municipal
School Board. After five years of service he was told that he would
not be needed for the 1972-73 school year. Aggrieved by his
dismissal, Walker commenced an appeal to an appeal board
constituted under the Education Act. 82 His principal contention on
appeal was that he was the holder of a "permanent contract'' 83 in
terms of the Education Act and could only be dismissed for "just
cause". 84 To establish his status, Walker relied upon the following
provision."8
A teacher who has had a contract or contracts with a school board
for more than two consecutive years, inclusive of the school year
1971-72, shall be deemed to have had a permanent contract.
81. (1973). 6 N.S.R. (2d) 1; 42 D.L.R. (3d) 105 (sub nom. Re Walker and West
Hants Municipal School Board) (S.C., A.D.).
82. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 81 as am. S.N.S. 1972, c. 29.
83. As defined in s. 76(1) (a) of the Education Act, R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 81 as am.
S.N.S. 1972, c. 29.
84. Section 76(5) (b) (1).
85. Section 76(16). Walker's problem was a little more complicated in that he had
been dismissed before the amendments to the Education Act had received Royal
Assent and was not able to bring himself within the normal twenty day time limit
for appeals (s. 76(7)). However, to make it even clearer that the Act was intended
to have retroactive effect, s. 76(18) provided:
(18) Notwithstanding subsection (7) hereof, where subsequent to the
twenty-ninth day of February, 1972, and prior to the date this Act receives
Royal Assent a teacher has had his permanent contract terminated, he may
appeal only upon the merits of the case the termination by giving written notice
of appeal to the school board within twenty days of the date this Act receives
Royal Assent.
Walker received notice of termination of March 22, 1972, and appealed within
twenty days of May 15, 1972, the date on which the amendments received Royal
Assent.
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However, the appeal board refused to accept that Walker could rely
on this section, its decision being based on the presumption that
legislation does not have retroactive effect. On the application for
relief in the nature of certiorari, it was argued and accepted by Hart
J.86 and the Appeal Division that this constituted an error of law on
the face of the record. 87 Indeed, there is very little doubt that the
courts were right and the board wrong on this point. The structure of
the legislation makes it abundantly clear that the relevant section
was included to clarify the position of those teachers with more than
two years' service prior to the passing of the Act.
The real interest of the case lies in three other points.
1. The Appeal Division's conception of what constituted the
record.
2. The Appeal Division's reversal of the trial judge's remission
of the matter back to a differently-constituted board of
appeal.
3. The Appeal Division's treatment of the Board's elaboration
of what constituted "just cause".
1. The Record
The most commonly cited exposition of what constitutes the
record for the purposes of error of law on the face of the record
challenges, and indeed the one used by Cooper J.A. delivering the
judgment in Walker, 88 is that of Denning L.J. (as he then was) in R.
v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte
Shaw89:
I think the record must contain at least the document which
initiates the proceedings, the pleadings, if any, and the
adjudication, but not the evidence, nor the reasons, unless the
tribunal chooses to incorporate them.
However, it seemed as if the common law position had been
changed in Nova Scotia by virtue of the 1972 Civil Procedure
Rules. 90
56.07 (1) There shall be endorsed upon an originating notice for
an order in the nature of certiorari a notice to the following
86. (1973),6N.S.R. (2d) 15; 39 D.L.R. (3d) 63 (S.C., T.D.).
87. (1973), 6 N.S.R. (2d) 1 at 10-11; 42 D.L.R. (3d) 105 at 111-12 (per Cooper
J.A., delivering the judgment of himself, McKinnon C.J.N.S. and Coffin J.A.).
88. Id. at 5; 42 D.L.R. (3d) at 107-08.
89. [1952] 1 K.B. 338 at 352; [1952] 1 All E.R. 122 at 131 (C.A.).
90. These came into force March 1,1972.
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effect, adapted as may be necessary and addressed to the judge,
magistrate, justice or justices, officer, clerk or tribunal,
"You are hereby required forthwith after service of this
originating notice on you to return to the prothonotary at
......... Nova Scotia, the judgment, order, decision or
reasons for judgment, together with the process commencing the
proceeding, the evidence and all exhibits filed, if any, and all
things touching the proceeding as fully and entirely as they
remain in your custody, together with this notice"
(2) All things required by paragraph (1) to be returned to a
prothonotary shall, for the purposes of an application for an order
in the nature of certiorari, be deemed to be part of the record.
On its face, this would seem to indicate that the reasons for the
decision as well as the evidence are to be considered part of the
record for review purposes, whether specifically incorporated as
part of the formal order or not.
In Walker, the dissenting member of the appeal board had
returned to the Court handwritten notes of evidence that he had
taken during the hearing. Not surprisingly it was held that such
notes were not included as part of the record under Rule 56.07,
principally because the tribunal as a whole had not adopted or
agreed upon them as being a true record of the proceedings. 9 1
However, Cooper J.A. (delivering the judgment of the Court)
continued:
9 2
I may add that, in any event, I do not think that Rule 56.07(2)
was intended to alter the substantive law governing the use of
evidence by a Court in certiorari proceedings. The principles
applicable are that the evidence may only be examined in a search
for errors of jurisdiction and not with respect to its sufficiency or
weight . . . If the evidence were examined for sufficiency or
weight, the Court would put itself in the position of exercising an
appellate rather than a supervisory jurisdiction.
Even allowing for a presumption against the common law being
altered by subordinate legislation, 93 it is difficult to agree with this
narrow interpretation of the word "record". Given the confusion
that has surrounded the precise nature of the record for the purposes
of review for error of law on the face of the record, 94 the most likely
91. (1973),6N.S.R. (2d) I at7;42 D.L.R. (3d) 105at 109.
92. Id.
93. See Craies on Statute Law, supra, note 40 at 339-40, for examples of where
this presumption has been applied.
94. For a good discussion of this problem, see R. F. Reid, Administrative Law and
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reason for a provision such as Rule 56.07 is to clear away the doubts
created by the common law. More specifically, there has been
criticism of Denning L.J.'s position in Shaw - that whether the
evidence and the reasons are part of the record depends on whether
the tribunal incorporates them formally in its order. The record, it is
argued, should not depend on the whim of the tribunal, particularly
in relation to the reasons given for decisions. Thus, Rule 56.07 can
be seen as a provision which eliminates an undesirable discretionary
power of tribunals and makes the evidence and reasons part of the
record in all instances.
In the light of this, the interpretation given to the word "record"
by Cooper J.A. would seem to be quite strained in that it in effect
confines the record as defined in Rule 56.07 to situations where the
challenge is on the basis of jurisdictional error. Where the ground of
challenge is non-jurisdictional error of law, the record continues to
have its uncertain common law content. Cooper J.A. is also wrong
in his justification of the interpretation. When he asserts that
evidence can only be looked at for jurisdictional error but not on
questions of sufficiency or weight, he is failing to take account of
the fact that the evidence may also reveal non-jurisdictional error of
law. To quote de Smith:95
If the order purports to incorporate all the relevant evidence, error
of law will be apparent if there is no evidence in support of a
recorded finding of primary fact or in support of any material fact,
or if the record shows that inadmissible evidence was admitted or
admissible evidence rejected.
To look at the evidence does not necessarily involve one of two
alternatives - a legitimate search for jurisdictional error or an
illegitimate review of sufficiency or weight. There are other
legitimate reasons for looking at such material.
Of course, Cooper J.A.'s general remarks about Rule 56.07 are
only dicta in that the material in question in this case was clearly
outside Rule 56.07 anyway. It is therefore to be hoped that this
question will be given further consideration at another time.
2. Remission Back to Another Appeal Board
Naturally, the applicant Walker wanted the matter determined
Practice (Toronto: Butterworths, 1971) at Chapter 14, "What is the Record?"
(367). See also A. S. Abel, Materials for Consideration in Certiorari (1963-64),
15 U. Toronto L.J. 102.
95. Supra, note 76 at 360.
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properly by an appeal board. 96 It is therefore surprising that he did
not seek an order in the nature of mandamus to compel an appeal
board to hear the matter in accordance with the law in addition to an
order in the nature of certiorari. This failure did not however
trouble either the Trial Court or the Appeal Division, both of which
added a new and desirable dimension to the law of certiorari by not
only quashing the decision but also ordering its remission.
97
The point at which the two courts disagreed however was whether
the power to remit also included the power to remit to a
96. At least this would be the normal assumption. Note, however, the following
remarks by one of Walker's counsel:
We sought to question [the decision of the ad hoc board] and faced a real
problem. As one of the grounds was a failure to observe the rules of natural
justice, we had difficulty in deciding whether to ask for certiorari quashing the
board's decision per se and correcting it, or for a mandamus requiring the board
to rehear the appeal following the rules of natural justice. We opted for
certiorari hoping to get a final decision from the trail judge on the matter...
[However, as a result of the Appeal Division decision remitting the matter back]
we ended up in exactly the position we tried to avoid by seeking certiorari, i.e. a
rehearing which we thought would be the result of an order in the nature of
mandamus.
(W. B. Gillis in "When is a Mandamus Available as an Administrative Law
Remedy", supra, note 3 at 59).
This attitude would however appear to misconceive the nature of certiorari.
Certiorari can only quash. It does not allow the court to make the decision it thinks
the appeal body should have made. This would be to transform certiorari from a
review to an appellate remedy. Therefore, in this situation, even though the appeal
board's decision was quashed the original dismissal continues untouched and short
of a direct attack on that dismissal, the only appropriate course of action for Walker
was to have the matter sent back to the appeal board.
97. There would appear to be no basis for this either in the common law or the new
N.S. Code of Civil Procedure. (See de Smith, supra, note 76 at 357-58: "The
jurisdiction to quash for error of law on the face of the record is not an appellate
jurisdiction. Thus, the court cannot vary the inferior tribunal's order unless the
defective part is severable so that the remainder can be left intact; nor can it
substitute its own order or refer the order back to the inferior tribunal with
directions as to the proper application of the law. To this extent review by way of
appeal is to be preferred to review by certiorari. But if any applicant seeks not only
an order of certiorari to quash but also an order of mandamus to compel the tribunal
to rehear and determine the matter according to law, the court may, in granting the
application, indicate to the tribunal what are the correct legal principles by which it
must guide itself [footnotes omitted]"). Note, however, s. 52(d) of the Federal
Court Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 1, which gives the Federal Court of Appeal, on an
application to review and set aside the decision of a federal statutory
decision-maker under s. 28, power to
.. . refer the matter back to the board, commission or other tribunal for
determination in accordance with such directions as it considers to be
appropriate.
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newly-constituted board.98 The Appeal Division judgment em-
phasizes the supervisory role of the courts and in effect states that the
Court would be exceeding that role if it took the decision-making
power away from the original board and directed the formation of a
new one, merely because the original board had already made an
error of law. 99
Undoubtedly, what was at the back of Hart J.'s mind in remitting
to a new board was that the old board was not really suited to the
task because it had already decided the matter in a manner adverse
to the applicant. There was no suggestion, however, of any bias on the
part of the original board. Of course if this had been argued and a
reasonable likelihood of bias established, Hart J. would undoubt-
edly have been justified in remitting the matter to a new board.
However, as a result of the Appeal Division's decision, it is now
clear that previous errors of law and an adverse decision in the same
matter do not disqualify a board from rehearing the case. Indeed, in
the absence of bias, they have a right to do so.
3. "Just Cause"
If Walker was a probationary teacher as had been contended by
the school board and the appeal board he could have had his contract
terminated at the end of any year. 100 However, notwithstanding the
finding that he was a probationary employee, the appeal board went
on to consider whether there was just cause for his dismissal. From
this, the argument could be made that the error of law was
immaterial in that the board in fact dealt with him in the alternative
as if he had a permanent contract. 10 1
However, Cooper J.A. refused to accept this argument. Because
one member of the Board had misconceived the applicant's status,
he did not really look at the question of "just cause" in its proper
statutory context. 10 2 In other words, Cooper J.A. saw a difference
between asking whether there was "just cause" to terminate a
98. Hart J. without discussion had remitted the matter to a new ad hoc board:
(1973), 6 N.S.R. (2d) 15 at 37; 39 D.L.R. (3d) 63 at 81.
99. (1973), 6 N.S.R. (2d) 1 at 14-15; 42 D.L.R. (3d) 105 at 115.
100. Section 76(5) (a).
101. For an example of a refusal to review on the basis of the immateriality of an
error of law, see R. v. Alberta Oil and Gas Conservation Board, Ex parte
Mountain Pacific Pipelines Ltd. (1965), 55 D.L.R. (2d) 189; 54 W.W.R. 693 (sub
nom. Mountain Pacific Pipelines Ltd. v. Canadian Hydrocarbons Ltd.) (Alta. S.C.
-Chambers).
102. (1973), 6 D.L.R. (2d) I at 12-13; 42 D.L.R. (3d) 105 at 113-114.
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probationary contract at the end of any particular year and asking
whether there was "just cause" to dismiss someone with a
permanent contract.' 03 This approach parallels that of Macdonald
J.A. in a later case where the Court was asked to set aside an
arbitration award104 and the justification for the approach comes
through quite strongly in the following extract. 1
0 5
• . . The Board thus did deal with the issue of "reasonable and
just cause" but did so as part of their consideration of the issue
whether the penalty of discharge was excessive and not within the
framework of the real and only issue submitted. There is no way
of knowing if the Board would have found the non-existence of
reasonable and just cause had they treated the issue properly and
not looked at it as a disciplinary matter. Frankfurter, J. in Rogers
v. Helvering, 320 U.S. 410, 413 (1943) said:
In law also the right answer usually depends on putting the
right question.
The other majority member of the board had however clearly
considered the matter of "just cause" in the alternative. Given that
there was already an error of law finding against one of the majority
decisions, the Court did not need to go on and deal with the second
majority decision. Nevertheless, Cooper J.A. agreed with the trial
judge and held that the other member of the majority had
misconceived the legal meaning of "just cause" .106 Of course,
when the question of "just cause" arises the distinction between
error of law and error of fact becomes very difficult. Nevertheless,
in terms of the other majority decision, a finding that the principal
of the school recommended the dismissal of Walker responsibly
does not amount in any way to an assessment of whether there was
"just cause" for the dismissal. 1
07
Walker v. Keating is not a very controversial case in the finding
of error of law on the face of the record. Whether the statute was
retroactive or not was an issue on which the Court was just as,
indeed more, competent than the appeal board and, though the issue
103. Of course, someone on a probationary contract could be let go for any reason,
so the question can be asked as to whether the Court's interpretation of the
Chairman's reasoning process is really accurate.
104. Canadian General Electric Co. v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers
International Union, Local 9-832 (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 550; 56 D.L.R. (3d) 745
(S.C., A.D.).
105. Id. at 563-64; 56 D.L.R. (3d) at 754.
106. (1973), 6 D.L.R. 1 at 13; 42 D.L.R. (3d) 105 at 114.
107. See the trial judgment of Hart J.: (1973), 6 N.S.R. (2d) 15 at 36-37; 39
D.L.R. (3d) 63 at 80-81.
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of "just cause" is one on which the appeal board decision would be
entitled normally to some deference, the majority members of the
appeal board in this instance really misconceived the legal
significance of the term. However, it is in the relatively minor
issues that the decision will have an impact beyond its facts. The
holding that the "record" as defined in Rule 56.07 does not
constitute the record for error of law on the face of the record review
leaves this area of the law in an unfortunate state. However, this is
to be contrasted with the new flexibility that the Appeal Division
attributed to certiorari, a flexibility which allows certiorari to fill
some of the role occupied traditionally by mandamus.
V. Natural Justice
In the last two or three years, the Nova Scotia courts have
encountered quite a number of cases raising natural justice issues.
Indeed, the arguments made have virtually run the whole gamut of
the natural justice spectrum. There have been two fascinating
decisions involving allegations of bias - Tomco v. Nova Scotia
Labour Relations Board'0 8 and Hawkins v. Halifax County
Residential Tenancies Board.10 9 However, I will not be dealing
with this aspect of these two cases here in the light of Brian
Flemming's discussion of them in his paper "Bias in a Modem
Context" delivered at the "Current Issues in Administrative Law"
Conference. 110
1. Cluney'l
The first case that I wish to touch upon is however one which
raises the basic issue of remedial relief for failure to hold a hearing.
Raymond Cluney had his driver's licence suspended by the
Registrar of Motor Vehicles under s. 251 (1) (d) of the Motor Vehicle
Act. 112 The basis for the suspension was that he was
108. (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 277 (S.C., A.D.). This case was dealt with at first
instance by the Appeal Division having been reserved for its decision by Cowan
C.J.T.D. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, Laskin C.J.C., delivering the
decision of the Court, found "the allegation [of bias] to be without substance". (See
(1975), 7 N.R. 317 at 330).
109. (1974),47 D.L.R. (3d) 117 (N.S.S.C., T.D.).
110. Supra, note 3.
111. Cluney v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 247; 53
D.L.R. (3d) 468 (S.C., A.D.), rev'g (1974), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 256 (S.C., T.D.).
112. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 191.
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• . . an habitual, reckless or negligent driver of a motor vehicle
However, while s. 251(1) gives the power of immediate suspension
to the Registrar, there is a protection to the affected person afforded
by subs. (2):
(2) Whenever the Registrar suspends the license or the privilege
of obtaining a license of any person for any reason set forth in
sub-section (1), he shall immediately notify the licensee and
afford him an opportunity of a hearing or of offering an
explanation and upon such hearing or explanation the
Registrar shall either rescind his order of suspension or, good
cause appearing therefor, may suspend the license or the
privilege of obtaining a license of such person for a further
period or revoke said license.
Cluney was notified by the Registrar as required by the. subsection
and exercised his right to apply for a hearing. The hearing which
then took place was an interview, not with the Registrar but with an
Inspector Nicholson of the Nova Scotia Registry of Motor Vehicles.
At that interview Cluney endeavoured to put his case for the
removal of the suspension but Inspector Nicholson was adamant and
confirmed the order made by the Registrar. A form to that effect
was prepared but gave no indication of having been seen by the
Registrar.
Discontented with the treatment which he had received, Cluney
commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court for an order in the
nature of certiorari. Having regard to the express wording of the
section providing for an after the event hearing, there seemed little
reason to suspect that Cluney was seeking the correct remedy.
Indeed, Morrison J., the trial judge, had little difficulty in finding that
the Registrar acting under s. 251(2) was exercising a quasi-judicial
function, 1 13 the traditional requirement for the prerogative remedy
of certiorari. He then, however, proceeded to treat Atkin L.J.'s
famous dictum in the Electricity Commissioners case" 4 as if it were
a statute and held that the suspension of a driver's licence was not
something "affecting the rights of subjects". 115
113. (1974), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 256 at 257.
114. "Wherever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions
affecting the rights of subjects, and having to act judicially, act in excess of their
legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench
Division exercised in their writs [of certiorari and prohibition]", per Atkin L.J. (as
he then was) in R. v. Electricity Commissioners, Ex parte London Electricity Joint
Committee, [1924) 1 K.B. 171 at 205 (C.A.).
115. (1974), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 256 at 258.
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I conclude from this, that operating a motor vehicle on the
highway in Nova Scotia is a privilege extended by the Province
and not a right. 11
6
Thus, for Morrison J., Cluney did not even have any entitlement to
proceed to argue the merits of his case. He had sought the
inappropriate remedy.
In so far as the authority to drive a motor vehicle on the roads of
Nova Scotia depends on the discretion of the state, there is of course
no doubt that that authority is a privilege in Hohfeldian terms."
1 7
Moreover, there has recently been a resurrection by the Supreme
Court of Canada of the "rights" test for the implication of the duty
to give a hearing and the availability of certiorari-type review when
the statute is silent, 1 8 despite other courts' movement away from
such a test. 119 However, this use of the "rights" test has not been in
contexts where the statute expressly provides for a hearing.
Accordingly, it comes as no surprise at all to learn that the Appeal
Division had no difficulty in reversing Morrison J. on the point,
finding that the express provision in the Act for a hearing was itself
sufficient to make certiorari available.' 20 Indeed, the matter had
already been determined contrary to Morrison J.'s approach in
a Manitoba Queen's Bench decision. Freedman J. (as he then was)
had stated in Re Watt and the Registrar of Motor Vehicles:'
21
116. Id.
117. Not only does s. 251(2) use the word "privilege", but, more importantly, s.
60(1) provides:
The Department with approval of the Minister may refuse to issue a driver's
license or a beginner's license to any person.
Of course, once issued, the licence might be seen as a right that cannot be removed
unless certain facts exist.
118. See e.g., R. v. Mitchell (1975), 6 N.R. 389 (S.C.C.) and Prata v. Minister of
Manpower and Immigration (1974), 52 D.L.R. (3d) 383; 3 N.R. 484 (S.C.C.)
where parole and the ability of non-Canadians to remain in Canada are described as
privileges.
119. See e.g. Lazarov v. Secretary of State of Canada, [1973] F.C. 827; 39
D.L.R. (3d) 738 (C.A.) (right to natural justice in citizenship application). Note
however that in Tomco v. N.S. Labour Relations Board (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 277
at 301 (discussed infra), MacKeigan C.J.N.S. was careful to characterize a cease
and desist order issued by the Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board as a decision
affecting Tomco's rights.
120. (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d), 247 at 253; 53 D.L.R. (3d) 468 at 473.
121. (1957), 13 D.L.R. (2d) 124 at 128; 24 W.W.R. 371 at 375; 27 C.R. 401 at
405 (Man. Q.B.). Note however s. 18(3) of the Manitoba Highway Traffic Act,
R.S.M. 1954, c. 112, which seemingly gave the Minister of Highways a discretion
with respect to the award of licences.
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There is no doubt whatever that the Registrar of Motor Vehicles
in deciding to cancel or suspend the driving licence of a person
under s. 134 is determining a question affecting the right of a
subject.
Morrison J. had cited but ultimately ignored this statement.122 Not
so the Appeal Division. 12 3
Despite his ruling on the unavailability of the remedy being
sought, Morrison J. went on and dealt briefly with the allegations of
breach of the rules of natural justice. His cursory opinion was that
no breaches had occurred. 124 Here too the Appeal Division had little
difficulty in disagreeing. They found that s. 251(2), by necessary
implication, required the decision to be taken by the Registrar and,
in the absence of any express provision in the statute, implied the
normal presumption that judicial or quasi-judicial functions cannot
be delegated. 125 Indeed, the absence of any evidence of any
consideration of the appeal by the Registrar did not even leave open
the argument that he could delegate the hearing process provided he
took the ultimate decision himself.' 26 Whether this would have
saved the decision if everything else had been satisfactory is not all
that clear from the judgment of the Appeal Division. However a
statement that "[t]he Registrar should now . . . hold a hearing"
would seem to indicate that the Court intended that Cluney had a
right to personal audience before the Registrar. 127
As well as the wrongful delegation ground, the Appeal Division
also found another breach of the rules of natural justice. According
to the Court not only the affidavit of Cluney but also Inspector
Nicholson's record of the inquiry indicated that he had not
approached his task with the proper frame of mind.' 2 8 His attitude
was one of trying to ascertain ways to improve the applicant's
driving habits rather than considering whether Cluney had any basis
for his arguments that the suspension had been unjustly imposed.
2. Re Otis
All in all, Cluney was a clear case of reviewable breach of the
122. (1974), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 256 at 257.
123. (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 247 at 253; 53 D.L.R. (3d) 468 at 473.
124. (1974), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 256 at 259.
125. (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 247 at 254-55; 53 D.L.R. (3d) 468 at 475.
126. See e.g. Tomco v. Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board (1974), 9 N.S.R.
(2d) 277 (S.C., A.D.),affd (1975), 7 N.R. 317 (S.C.C.), discussed infra.
127. (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 247 at 255; 53 D.L.R. (3d) 468 at 475-76.
128. Id. at 254; 53 D.L.R. (3d) at 474.
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rules of natural justice and the kind of case that you would normally
expect to be resolved satisfactorily at the Trial Division level.
However, not all the applicants for relief in the period under review
had quite the same merit in their claim as Cluney. In Otis Elevator
Co. v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local 125, 129
the Appeal Division rightly rejected an argument which would
have had the effect of making it a breach of the rules of natural
justice to make a wrong decision. 130 Natural justice as it is
perceived in judicial review proceedings has never been a device
with which to attack the merits of a decision. It has remained a
source of procedural protection and given the scope afforded by
other grounds of review for attacking the merits albeit indirectly, it
should remain a procedural doctrine.
3. Canada Automatic Sprinkler Association
Of considerably more merit but equally doomed to failure from a
precedent point of view was the argument that it was a breach of the
rules of natural justice for the Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board
not to give reasons for its decisions. In Canada Automatic
Sprinkler Association v. Labour Relations Board, 131 Cowan C.J.
T.D. held that the Board was not in breach of the rules of natural
justice either in failing to give reasons for declaring a third party as
an "interested party" at a certification hearing or in failing to give
reasons for a previous decision which affected the proceedings
presently before the Board. Though it has often been suggested and,
indeed, is now statutorily provided in Ontario, 132 that a failure to
give reasons should constitute reviewable procedural error, the
weight of authority is clearly the other way.1 33 The arguments of
129. (1973), 5 N.S.R. (2d) 437; 36 D.L.R. (3d) 402 (sub nom. Re Otis Elevator
Co. and International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local 125) (S.C., A.D.).
130. Id. at 450-51; 36 D.L.R. (3d) at411.
131. (1974), 14 N.S.R. (2d) 36 at 62 (S.C., T.D.).
132. Under s. 17 of The Statutory Powers Procedure Act, S.O. 1971, c. 47, it is
provided, with respect to tribunals coming within the ambit of that Act, that
* . .[a] tribunal shall give its final decision and order, if any, in any proceedings
in writing and shall give reasons in writing therefor if requested by a party.
See Re Di Nardo and Liquor Licence Board of Ontario (1974), 5 0.R. (2d) 124
(Ont. H.C.) for a finding of inadequate reasons under s. 17.
133. See e.g. Lazar v. Association of Professional Engineers of Manitoba, [1971]
5 W.W.R. 614 (Man. Q.B); Re Gill Lumber Chipman (1973) Ltd. and United
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local Union 2142 (1973), 7
N.B.R. (2d) 41; 42 D.L.R. (3d) 271 (C.A.).
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course are that it is a valuable discipline for tribunals to have to go
through the motions of delivering reasons and that affected persons
after presenting a carefully argued case should be entitled to know
how the tribunal disposed of their arguments. Contrary to this and in
support of the present common law position are arguments such as:
writing decisions is wasteful of administrative resources; the courts
do not have to give reasons; giving reasons leads to greater review.
(On this last point, and by way of digression, one presumes that
after Schwartz particularly, the Nova Scotia Labour Relations
Board may be even more reticent about giving reasons than it was
previously). Another argument is that a requirement to give reasons
can be met easily by simply reciting the facts and the conclusion
reached, and therefore to require reasons is not worth the effort. In
this respect it is significant that the as yet unproclaimed Nova Scotia
Criminal Injuries Compensation Act' 3 4 not only requires reasons to
be given by the tribunal but also attempts to spell out what those
reasons should contain in the same vein as an earlier version of the
Ontario Statutory Powers Procedure Act. 135
4. Tomco
Cowan C.J.T.D. in the Automatic Sprinkler Association case also
exhibited concern for the smooth functioning of the administrative
process at another point when he held that it was no breach of the
rules of natural justice to refuse a request for an adjournment to
enable better preparation when notice of the hearing had been given
well in advance. 136 Indeed, this concern also characterized another
decision involving the province's labour relations process. Tomco
v. N.S. Labour Relations Board137 involved not only an allegation
of bias against the Construction Industry Panel of the Nova Scotia
Labour Relations Board but also an allegation that the Panel had
prevented a fair hearing by failing to give sufficient notice before
134. S.N.S. 1975, c. 8. See s. 18.
135. Section 18 defines reasons to include
(a) any agreed findings of facts;
(b) the findings of fact on the evidence; and
(c) the conclusions of law based on the findings mentioned in clauses (a)
and (b).
This is the same as s. 14(2) of Bill 130, 2d Session, 28th Legislature, Ontario,
1968-69.
136. (1974), 14N.S.R.(2d)36at67-71.
137. (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 277 (S.C., A.D.); affd (1975), 7 N.R. 317 (S.C.C.).
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making a cease and desist order against the plaintiff, Tomco, and
his Union.
As in Cluney, the relevant legislation seemed to indicate that a
hearing should be given before an order was made. Section 49(2) of
the Trade Union Act 138 provided for the making of an interim order
and s. 15(9) provided:
The Board shall determine its own procedure, but shall, subject
to subsection (1), in every case give an opportunity to all
interested parties to present evidence and make representation.
It was argued but quickly rejected by the Appeal Division that subs.
10 precluded the application of subs. (9) to s. 49(2).139 According
to subs. 10, the Board at the discretion of the Chairman could deal
with a s. 49 matter
... by each member conferring separately with the Chief
Executive Officer and each deciding the matter.
This exemption from actually convening as a Board was according
to the Court without effect on the basic principles of natural justice
enshrined in subs. (9). 140
MacKeigan C.J.N.S. then went on to consider the rules of natural
justice as they related to this decision-making process and the basis
for his decision that the rules had not been broken in the case can be
found in his peroration, a peroration which emphasizes the
flexibility and variation of the principles of natural justice as they
apply to various forms of tribunal decision-making. 141
The rule is "that the parties be given adequate opportunity to be
heard". . . This does not mean that the matter has to be treated
like a trial inter partes, which it is not, or that "adequate notice"
138. S.N.S. 1972, c. 19.
139. (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 277 at 300.
140. Id. Note, however, that Laskin C.J.C. delivering the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Canada took a different view on this issue. He held that s. 49(2),
when it provided that the Board may make an interim order after an investigation
I"notwithstanding any provision of this Act" [emphasis added], excludes reliance
on s. 15(9) and the right to a hearing established thereunder. See (1975), 7 N.R.
317 at 331-32. To support this argument he pointed to the after the event hearing
provided for in s. 49(4) (id. at 331). However, as I read the judgment, he did
not exclude completely the possibility of arguing for certain procedural protections
before a s. 49(2) order is made. This seems implicit in his separate finding that
Tomco could not complain about the fairness of the investigation since he was fully
aware of what was involved and had been given an opportunity to put his case to the
Chief Executive Officer (id. at 329 and 332).
141. Id. at 301. See also Laskin C.J.C.'s judgment: 7 N.R. at 332. Laskin C.J.C.
emphasised the emergency nature of the situation as well as the statutory context.
906 The Dalhousie Law Journal
requires that all evidence be given or related to a person under
investigation, or that the hearing be other than an invitation to
talk, or that the "hearing" or the investigation referred to in S.
49 (1) has to be conducted by the Panel members personally.
Section 15(10) contemplates that the Chief Executive Officer will
conduct the investigation, advise the members of the results and
co-ordinate their separate decisions. The basic question is
whether the plaintiff was in fact fairly treated, having regard to
the nature of the legislation and the facts of the particular case.
Basically, what the Chief Executive Officer had done in this case
was to collect the facts after he had received a complaint, telephone
the plaintiff and put those facts to him. The facts were not denied by
the plaintiff who indicated an unwillingness as business agent of the
union to order his men to stop picketing the complainant's plant and
to return to work. Indeed, this was a process with which the plaintiff
was familiar from past experience and, which according to the Chief
Executive Officer, was the usual practice in such cases. After
completing his investigation the Chief Executive Officer contacted
the three members of the panel, reported the situation, and received
instructions to issue the order.
According to the Court, this procedure was quite adequate in the
circumstances. Tomco knew "what it was all about" 14 2 and he had
not raised any questions. If he had, and the Chief Executive Officer
had refused to consider his representations, the position may have
been different. The approach of the Court in this situation is quite
obviously one which indicates a most desirable sensitivity to the
legislative scheme as well as to the legitimate interests of the labour
relations process. As well, from a more general point of view, it
demonstrates the great range of decision-making processes
encompassed by the principles of natural justice and fair hearings.
As the Court emphasizes, in quoting de Smith,1 4 2a the absence of a
formal hearing should not be fatal in a case such as this, particularly
when the affected person is fully aware of the situation.
5. Centennial Properties
A desire not to make the rules of natural justice a millstone
around the necks of tribunals can also be seen in the judgment of
Jones J. in Centennial Properties Ltd. v. Public Service
142. Id. at 303. See also 7 N.R. at 329.
142a. Id. at 303.
Recent Developments in Nova Scotian Administrative Law 907
Commission.143 This case concerned an arbitration award under
which the applicants were ordered to transfer a water system to the
City of Halifax for a nominal sum. During the course of its decision
the arbitration board referred to engineering plans which were not
put in as evidence at the hearing. However, the plans were referred
to in the relevant agreement between the City and Centennial
Properties, which of course was admitted in evidence. In a most
sensible decision Jones J. ruled that the board could not be faulted
for obtaining the plans, which were vital to the interpretation of the
agreement, from the City rather than the parties to the agreement,
particularly as the City was not a party to the arbitration and as there
was no question raised as to the accuracy of the plans. 144 It was
simply not a case of covertly taking evidence behind the parties'
backs in circumstances where they had no chance to reply. Indeed,
as in R. v. Schiff, Ex parte Trustees of Ottawa Civic Hospital, ' 45 an
Ontario authority cited by Jones J.,146 the evidence was a publicly
available document known to both parties.
6. Re Busche
In Re Busche147 the court was confronted with an issue somewhat
similar to that raised in Tomco but, because of the different factual
context, decided in favour of the applicant and awarded relief in the
nature of certiorari.
Busche was a school teacher who had written letters in the local
press disagreeing with certain policies of the Nova Scotia Teachers'
Union. This Union was given statutory recognition by the Teaching
Profession Act' 4 8 and, under s. 11 of that statute, the Professional
Committee of the Union has certain disciplinary powers with
respect to matters referred to it by a Local of the Union or the Union
Executive.
The Executive, upset by the Busche criticisms, decided to refer
the matter to the Professional Committee and Ms. Busche was
informed that the Professional Committee would be considering a
143. S.H. 05876. Judgment delivered April 1, 1975. As yet unreported.
144. See Reasons for Judgment at 11-12.
145. [1970] 3 O.R. 476; 13 D.L.R. (3d) 304 (C.A.).
146. See Reasons for Judgment at 12.
147. S.H. 06332. Judgment of Cowan C.J.T.D. delivered April 23, 1975. As yet
unreported.
148. S.N.S. 1968, c. 109, as am. S.N.S. 1972, c. 131 and S.N.S. 1974, c. 127.
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charge that she had breached the NSTU Code of Ethics. 149 No
details were specified in this communication with Ms. Busche but
subsequently she was informed in writing by the President that she
was being charged with offences under two provisions in the Code
- first, making defamatory or other disparaging remarks
concerning another teacher and, secondly, taking individual action
in a matter that should be dealt with by the NSTU. Seven days after
this letter was written the hearings commenced and ultimately
resulted in the Committee recommending that Ms. Busche be
reprimanded in appropriate terms.
A number of issues were raised before Cowan C.J.T.D. in the
Trial Division of the Supreme Court. The first argument, and one
accepted by the Court, was that under s. 11 the Committee was
given jurisdiction not over breaches of the Code of Ethics but rather
over whether the accused was guilty of conduct unbecoming a
teacher. 150 Secondly, it was argued that the details of the charge in
the first communication were not sufficient notice in writing as
required by s. 11(2) of the Act and once again the Court was
prepared to accede to this argument. 151 Thirdly, it was argued that
the mandatory thirty day notice provision prevented the defects of
the first communication being cured. This also was accepted by the
Court. 1 52 Finally, the Court agreed that even the second
communication was not sufficient notice at least in that it did not
name the teachers allegedly defamed or disparaged. 153 Indeed these
names were not even given at the hearing.
It is of course possible to give the facts a reading more favourable
to the Committee and the NSTU than did the Court. It could, for
instance, be argued that a charge of breach of the Code of Ethics is
tantamount to a charge of conduct unbecoming a teacher and that
149. Under s. 10(1) (d) of the Act, the Council of the NSTU is given power to
make by-laws dealing with discipline, subject to approval by the Governor in
Council (subs. 3). However, the Code of Ethics was not brought about by this
process.
150. See Reasons for Judgment at 17.
151. Id. at 17-18.
152. Id.
153. Id. It is also worth noting that Cowan C.J.T.D. would have been prepared to
review the Professional Committee's decision on the basis of "no evidence" to
support a finding of any breach of the Code of Ethics (See 19-21). He also rejected
an argument that relief should be refused as a matter of discretion. He regarded the
sanction, that of reprimand, "a serious matter" and felt that it was important that
the remedy be granted so that the "name and reputation of the applicant should be
cleared" (at 21).
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the courts in dealing with tribunals such as this should not be too
concerned with the niceties of the language in which the charge is
framed. Similarly, it could be argued that, h la Tomco, Ms. Busche
knew what it was all about. After all there had been previous
correspondence between her and the NSTU and the original letter,
while not precisely identifying the provisions of the Code of Ethics
allegedly breached, at least identified the charges as stemming from
the letters written to the local press. Also, while the charge when
formulated more precisely did not name the teachers allegedly
defamed or disparaged, it could be argued that it must have been
abundantly clear to Ms. Busche in the circumstances that the
teachers in question were the ones she had criticized in her letters.
Why the Court chose to go the way it did rather than espouse the
Tomco-type approach is apparent in the following extract from
Cowan C.J.T.D.'s judgment. Referring to the first letter to Ms.
Busche, he stated' 5 4 :
I find that the notice was deficient, in that it did not give notice of
the charge, since it gave no particulars of any kind as to the
section of the Code of Ethics alleged to have been broken by the
applicant, and no particulars of the conduct of the applicant said
to be a breach of any particular provision of the Code. By
analogy, it would be patently absurd to consider that a charge in a
criminal matter merely alleging that the accused had committed a
breach of the Criminal Code of Canada, would constitute notice
to the accused of the offence with which he is charged.
This analogy to the Criminal Code is instructive in that it shows the
Chief Justice's attitude being influenced because of the
quasi-criminal nature of this hearing. This, of course, becomes
more acute when the possible range of sanctions under s. 11 are
examined - as well as reprimands, it provides for expulsion or
suspension from the union and recommendations to the Minister of
Education. 155 Quite obviously the decision of the Committee could
have a potentially serious impact on the teaching future of the
accused. Of course, it could be argued that the sanction in Tomco
was equally serious but at least the informality countenanced by the
Appeal Division in that case had specific legislative sanction and
was in response to situations which could be extremely urgent.
Moreover, there was provision in Tomco for a further after the event
154. Id. at 17-18.
155. See subs. 3.
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hearing.15 6 The legislation in issue in Busche gave no such
indications of informality. Furthermore, and of crucial significance,
is the fact that Tomco knew what was up in a much more precise
way than Busche. Certainly, Busche knew of the general
circumstances giving rise to the reference to the Committee but, in
terms of how the NSTU planned to relate those general
circumstances to the specifics of the Code of Ethics, she could but
guess at which of the provisions of that Code were to be invoked
against her. Accordingly, her knowledge lacked the precision
necessary to enable her to consider and prepare any defences.
Finally, given that a provision for thirty days' notice was
presumably included for the very purpose of enabling a defence to
be prepared, it is hardly surprising that the Court held the provision
to be mandatory and the subsequent supply of information not to be
curative. Indeed, the only possible criticism that might be made is
that the Court was perhaps a little harsh in criticizing the lack of
specificity of the second notice. If this had been provided thirty days
in advance, the argument that Busche knew what was up assumes
much more force. 157 Nevertheless, even on this point, the
Committee indicated a certain lack of good judgment in even
refusing to name the allegedly defamed or disparaged teachers at the
hearing.
7. N.S. Forest Industries
A natural justice issue of a somewhat different kind was also
raised in the N.S. Forest Industries case,' 5 8 already discussed from
a different perspective. In the course of his judgment, concurred in
by Macdonald J.A., Coffin J.A. considered the argument that there
was a breach of the natural justice rules in that the company "was
never given any opportunity to deal with the totality of its
position" 159 at the certification hearings. Of particular concern was
the Board's indication that it would obtain certain evidence from
both applicants and compare membership lists supplied by the
applicants with production lists provided by the five major
156. See s. 49(4) of the Trade Union Act, S.N.S. 1972, c. 19. This was adverted
to in the Judgment of Laskin C.J.C. in the Supreme Court of Canada (7 N.R. at
331).
157. In fact, it was posted only seven days before the hearing.
158. (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 91; 61 D.L.R. (3d) 97 (S.C., A.D.).
159. Id. at 98; 61 D.L.R. (3d) at 117.
160. Id. at 105; 61 D.L.R. (3d) at Ill.
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pulpwood buyers. 160 According to the company, this assurance
induced it not to supply that information itself with the result that
the subsequent breach of this assurance gave rise to a breach of the
rules of natural justice.
In dealing with this problem, Coffin J.A. considered cases where
the courts had reviewed for breach of the rules of natural justice
because of the tribunal not living up to assurances made to the
parties 16 1 but then concluded quite ambiguously
162
That is not quite the situation here and I would not decide the
question on this point alone...
However, Coffin J.A. then decided that this argument in
conjunction with the argument that the Board had not complied with
its own rules and procedures had led to breach of the rules of natural
justice. 163 Because there were many other things wrong with the
actions of the Board in the N.S. Forest Industries case it is hard to
fault the Court for skimming this problem superficially. Neverthe-
less, given the Board's assurance, the breach of the rules of natural
justice argument is in fact hard to resist. The Board, by those
assurances, prevented the company from presenting all the evidence
that it would have normally. Because of this, the only argument that
the breach of the assurance would not be a breach of the rules of
natural justice would be if the evidence in question was not relevant
to the inquiry, a finding that was not made in this case.
8. Hall v. Administrator of Family and Child Welfare
I have left to last the only case with which I really have any
serious quarrel. This is the decision of the Nova Scotia Supreme
Court - Appeal Division in Hall v. Administrator of Family and
161. Id. at 104-06; 61 D.L.R. (3d) at 116-18. The cases relied on wereShareefv.
Commissioner for Registration of Indian and Pakistani Residents, [1965] 3 W.L.R.
704 (P.C.) (Ceylon) and R. v. Liverpool Corporation, Ex parte Liverpool Taxi
Fleet Operators' Association, [1972] 2 Q.B. 299; [1972] 2 All E.R. 589 (C.A.).
Interestingly enough, Coffin J. A. cites, with apparent approval, Lord Denning
M.R.'s judgment in the Liverpool Corporation case, that procedural fairness was
required and prohibition could issue, even though an administrative rather than a
judicial or quasi-judical function was in issue. This represents quite a divergence
from conventional Canadian wisdom in this area though it. was probably not
necessary for the edcision in this case. See my article, Fairness: The New Natural
Justice (1975), 25 U. Toronto L.J. 281 for a discussion of this issue. This is an
expanded version of a paper which I delivered at the "Current Issues in
Administrative Law Conference" (supra, note 2 at 1).
162. Id. at 107-08; 61 D.L.R. (3d) at 119.
163. Id. at 114; 61 D.L.R. (3d) at 124.
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Child Welfare. 164 In fact it is not a case in which questions of
natural justice are raised directly at all. However, the effect of the
Appeal Division's decision was to deny to the applicant for relief
the benefit of a right to a hearing, a right which seemed clearly
established by statute.
The relevant facts are succinctly stated by Cooper J.A. delivering
the judgment of the Court. 16
5
The respondent made application by originating Notice (applica-
tion inter partes) for an order in the nature of mandamus requiring
the appellant in his capacity as Administrator of Family and Child
Welfare for the province of Nova Scotia . . . to reveal
information concerning the adoption of her child and particularly
the date of the adoption and the court in which the adoption had
taken place. The respondent sought this information to enable her
to launch an appeal from the adoption order under S. 13(1) of the
Adoption Act, R.S.N.S., 1967, c. 2, which reads:
(1) A person aggrieved by an order of a county court or a judge
thereof made under this Act may appeal therefrom to the
Supreme Court in like manner as appeals may be taken from
other judgments or orders of the county court.
The Appeal Division's response to this situation was to reverse the
trial judge's award of relief in the nature of mandamus in very short
order. Nowhere in any statute was the Administrator obliged
expressly to reveal the information requested by the applicant in her
application for relief in the nature of mandamus. 166 This led the
Court, after emphasizing the extraordinary nature of the relief
sought 167 ( a real bootstraps argument), to hold that the remedy
could only be granted if there was a clear legal duty imposed on the
Administrator and owed to the applicant. Never was the remedy to
be awarded in doubtful cases 168 and, given the absence of an
imperative duty in either the Child Welfare Act' 69 or the Adoption
Act, 170 the applicant had to fail. 17'
If there was ever a case of the mysteries of the prerogative
remedies defeating the substance of a claim, this could be it.
164. (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 677; 52 D.L.R. (3d) 237 (sub nom. Re Hall and
Johnson) (S.C., A.D.).
165. Id. at 678; 52 D.L.R. (3d) at 238.
166. Id. at 681; 52 D.L.R. (3d) at 240.
167. Id. at 680; 52 D.L.R. (3d) at 239.
168. Id. at 680; 52 D.L.R. (3d) at 240.
169. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 31.
170. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 2.
171. (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 677 at 681; 52 D.L.R. (3d) 237 at 240-41.
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However, I prefer to see this case for what it really is - a clear
example of the judges failing to deal properly with the prerogative
remedies. Despite what the Court says, the applicant's contention
that there was a legal duty to reveal the information sought would
seem to arise by clear and necessary implication. 172 The
Administrator was the only person possessed of all the relevant
information, information without which the right of appeal
conferred on the applicant by the Adoption Act was completely
nullified. The rhetorical question scarcely bears asking but, in view
of the Court's attitude, asked it must be. Why would the legislature
go to the trouble of creating a right of appeal if that right of appeal
could be nullified effectively by a departmental policy of
non-revelation? Perhaps the policy has some sound sociological
basis but it simply should not be able to be used to frustrate obvious
legislative policy. Necessary implication of a duty is not unknown
to the prerogative remedy of mandamus 173 and the Court's assertion
that the argument for an "implied duty of disclosure" is "not
sufficient" 174 is a totally inadequate response in the circumstances.
Fortunately in the recent development of the law relating to the
rules of natural justice in this province, Hall v. Administrator of
Family and Child Welfare stands as a remarkable exception to what
have otherwise been generally sensitive decisions, demonstrating
adequate concern with balancing the affected individuals' demands
for fair procedures against the competing demands of the
administrative process for flexibility of action unhampered by the
trappings of court-like procedures.
VI. Conclusion
My purpose in this article has been to survey some recent decisions in
the Administrative Law area in Nova Scotia. For the most part I have
avoided discussion of decisions written about elsewhere. However,
even allowing for that, there has been a certain amount of subjective
preference in the cases chosen. There has in fact been much activity
on other fronts not discussed here or elsewhere - the validity of
172. The trial judge Hart J. had no trouble with this notion. See 9 N.S.R. (2d) 682;
45 D.L.R. (3d) 757.
173. For example, it seems accepted that mandamus is available to compel a
tribunal to adhere to a duty to give a hearing implied from a statute. See de Smith
supra, note 76 at 209- 10. See e.g. R. v. Kent Police Authorit,, Ex parte Godden,
[1971]2 Q.B. 662; [1971]3 All E.R. 20 (C.A.).
174. (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 677 at 681, 52 D.L.R. (3d) 237 at 240.
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by-laws, zoning175  and otherwise, 176  further cases on the
availability of mandamus to compel the issue of building
permits, 177 the status of actions against the Crown in this
province,1 78 the reviewability of arbitration awards,1 79 the validity
of regulations,' 80 locus standi, 181 the constitutionality of a tribunal
under the BNA Act' 82 and the scope of statutory rights of appeal. ' 8
3
175. Lacewood Development Ltd. v. City of Halifax (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 692;
58 D.L.R. (3d) 383 (S.C., A.D.); Hollett and Hollett v. City of Halifax (1975), 13
N.S.R. (2d) 403 (S.C., A.D.); City of Halifax v. Provincial Planning Appeal
Board, S.H. 06648, judgment delivered: May 26, 1975, as yet unreported (S.C.,
T.D.) See also Brodie v. City of Halifax (No. 2) (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 415 (S.C.,
A.D.).
176. Boutilier v. Cape Breton Development Corporation (1972), 34 D.L.R. (3d)
374 (N.S.S.C., T.D.); Coastal Insurance Ltd. v. Town of Wolfville (1973), 13
N.S.R. (2d) 254; 40 D.L.R. (3d) 745 (S.C., T.D.).
177. Country View Ltd. v. City of Dartmouth (1974), 8 N.S.R. (2d) 1 (S.C.,
A.D.), leave to appeal refused 10 N.S.R. (2d) 546 (S.C.C.); Country View Ltd. v.
City of Dartmouth (No. 2) (1974), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 361 (actually both these cases
involved applications for a declaration of entitlement to a building permit rather
than mandamus); Chater v. City of Dartmouth, S.H. 05346, judgment delivered :
January 3,,1975, as yet unreported (S.C., T.D.). Note also that the Supreme Court
of Canada has dismissed an appeal from the decision in Dalhousie University v.
City of Halifax (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 643; 53 D.L.R. (3d) 610, discussed by
George Cooper in "Mandamus and Building Permits", supra, note 3. (Appeal
dismissed without reasons, February 27, 1976).
178. Braeside Farms Ltd. v. Nova Scotia Farm Loan Board (1973), 5 N.S.R. (2d)
685; 42 D.L.R. (3d) 480 (S.C., A.D.); McNeil v. Nova Scotia Board of Censors
(1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 85; 5 N.R. 43 (S.C.C.), affg (1974),9 N.S.R. (2d) 483; 53
D.L.R. (3d) 259 (sub nom. MacNeil v. Nova Scotia Board of Censors) (S.C.,
A.D.), affg (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 506; 46 D.L.R. (3d) 259 (sub nom. MacNeil v.
Nova Scotia Board of Censors) (S.C., T.D.).
179. See cases listed in note 80, supra.
180. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 968 v. Labour
Relations Board (1973), 14 N.S.R. (2d) 271; 43 D.L.R. (3d) 402 (sub nom. Re
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 968 and Michelin Tires
Manufacturing Co. of Canada) (S.C., T.D.).
181. McNeil v. Nova Scotia Board of Censors (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 85; 5 N.R.
43 (S.C.C.), affg (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 483; 53 D.L.R. (3d) 259 (S.C., A.D.),
affg (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 506; 46 D.L.R. (3d) 259; Brodie v. City of Halifax
(1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 415; 46 D.L.R. (3d) 528 (sub nom. Re Brodie and City of
Halifax) (S.C., T.D.), rev'd (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 380; 47 D.L.R. (3d) 454 (S.C.,
A.D.), leave to appeal refused (1974), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 560; 3 N.R. 214 (S.C.C.).
182. McNeil v. The Queen, S.H. 03925, judgment delivered: February 2, 1976, as
yet unreported (S.C., A.D.). The constitutional validity of s. 49 of the Nova Scotia
Trade Union Act, S.N.S. 1972, c. 19, giving the Nova Scotia Labour Relations
Board authority to issue cease and desist orders , was also in question in Tomco v.
Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board (1975), 7 N.R. 317 (S.C.C.), affg (1974), 9
N.S.R. (2d) 277 (S.C., A.D.).
183. Re Michelin Tires (Manufacturing) Canada Ltd. (1975), 13 N.S.R (2d) 587
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Because of space limitations, these very interesting matters will
unfortunately have to be left for another time.
In Volume 1, Number 1 of the Nova Scotia Law News, Hudson
Janisch wrote an article entitled "Administrative Law: Alive and
Well and Living in Nova Scotia". 184 If the quantity of litigation is
any indication that certainly still continues to be true. Indeed,
viewed qualitatively the title is also reasonably apt. For the most
part, the courts have been fact conscious, aware of the expertise of
tribunals and not unduly willing to intervene. There have, of course,
been exceptions to this generally high level of performance and
some of these exceptions have been dealt with in this note. The
major problem continues to be however the cut and paste nature of
many of the judgments - long extracts from previous decisions and
texts connected by a few cryptic sentences. Good decision-making
would seem to demand clear articulation of the reasoning process
leading to the result. Of all the decisions encountered in the period
under review perhaps only the judgments of MacKeigan C.J.N.S.
in the N.S. Forest Industries case and Tomco merit being followed
as models.
(S.C., T.D.), rev'd S.H. 00201, judgment delivered: March 15, 1976, as yet
unreported (S.C., A.D.); Re Imperial Oil Ltd. (1974), 8 N.S.R. (2d) 370; 50
D.L.R. (3d) 739 (application for leave to appeal); Imperial Oil Ltd. v. Board of
Commissioners of Public Utilities (1974), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 415; 52 D.L.R. (3d) 594
(sub nom. Re Imperial Oil Ltd. and Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities)
(S.C., A.D.). I have discussed these cases in a paper delivered at the "Government
Regulation and the Law Conference", supra, note 5. See "The Scope and
Principles of Statutory Appeals from Administrative Action in Nova Scotia", id. at
81.
184. Supra, note 6.

